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Laughter in Supreme Court oral arguments has been misunderstood,
treated as either a lighthearted distraction from the Court's serious work, or
interpreted as an equalizing force in an otherwise hierarchical environment.
Examining the more than nine thousand instances of laughter witnessed at
the Court since 1955, this Article shows that the Justices of the Supreme Court
use courtroom humor as a tool of advocacy and a signal of their power and
status. As the Justices have taken on a greater advocacy role in the modern
era, they have also provoked more laughter.
The performative nature of courtroom humor is apparent from the
uneven distribution of judicial jokes, jests, and jibes. The Justices
overwhelmingly direct their most humorous comments at the advocates with
whom they disagree, the advocates who are losing, and novice advocates.
Building on prior work, we show that laughter in the courtroom is yet another
aspect of judicial behavior that can be used to predict cases before Justices
have even voted. Many laughs occur in response to humorous comments, but
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that should not distract from the serious and strategic work being done by
that humor. To fully understand oral argument, Court observers would be
wise to take laughter seriously.
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Elena Kagan:
Kristen Waggoner:
Elena Kagan:
Kristen Waggoner:
Elena Kagan:
Noel Francisco:
Neil Gorsuch:
David Cole:
Stephen Breyer:
Why is there no speech in... creating a
wonderful hairdo?
Well, it may be artistic, it may be creative,
but what the Court asks when there's --
The makeup artist?
No...
It's called an artist. It's the makeup artist.
[LAUGHTER]. 1
... people pay very high prices for these
highly sculpted cakes, not because they
taste good, but because of their artistic
qualities. I think the more important point -
In fact, I have yet to have a... wedding
cake that I would say tastes great.
[LAUGHTER] .2
... that is not necessary to decide this case,
but.., in a future case that involved
physical participation in ... a religious
ceremony that an individual deeply
opposed, that a court... might create new
doctrine and draw a new line and say,
no .... We're going to make an exception
How do we do that? Because, you know, we
can't have 42,000 cases, each kind of
vegetable -- [LAUGHTER]. 3
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Master-
piece Cakeshop]. Note that Supreme Court transcripts do not indicate emphasis; however, the
emphasis is clear in the recording of the oral argument. See Oral Argument at 7:55, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Oral Argument, Masterpiece Cakeshop],
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts8/oral-argument-audio/24402 [https://perma.cc/VSD3-
ACJL].
2. Transcript of Oral Argument, Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 1, at 41.
3. Id. at 80.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court addressed whether a law sanctioning
a baker for his refusal to make a wedding cake for a gay couple was
contrary to the First Amendment in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission,4 the courtroom erupted into laughter seven
times during the extended ninety-minute oral argument. One episode
was inspired by Justice Kennedy inadvertently stumbling between the
words "case" and "cake."5 But in all six other episodes, there was a
serious point to the Justices' quips and comments that provoked the
courtroom gallery into laughter. As seen above, Justice Kagan was
illustrating the potential absurdity of Petitioner's argument that
making a wedding cake was a personal statement demanding free
speech protection. Kagan asked the serious question of how such
claims could be limited by posing the seemingly absurd question of
why hairstylists should not command the same respect.6 Justice
Breyer made a similar point about the potentially limitless
distinctions the Court would be asked to make if it ruled in favor of
the baker by resorting to the hyperbole of the Court deciding "42,000
cases, each kind of vegetable." Justice Gorsuch, in contrast, was
emphasizing that wedding cakes are not made or consumed for their
taste but for their symbolism and artistry, a jest that worked in
Petitioner's favor. It is unsurprising, then, that Justice Gorsuch
ultimately joined the majority opinion, which, while dodging the
question of whether there is an exception to antidiscrimination
4. See Brief in Opposition for Respondents at i, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No.
16-111), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/16-111-BIO-mullins-and-
craig.pdf [https://perma.ccW5S7-DXN5]; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/16-111-cert-petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9NS-YBGY].
5. Transcript of Oral Argument, Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 1, at 79 ("Suppose that
either in this case or some cases you have a very complex case -- cake, and -- case and cake --
[LAUGHTER].").
6. For a similar point made through humor, see Supreme Court Rules Gay Rights Do Not
Extend to Dessert, ONION (June 4, 2018, 12:51 PM), https://politics.theonion.com/supreme-court-
rules-gay-rights-do-not-extend-to-dessert- 1826541732 [https://perma.cc/5VHY-XV5B]:
We are choosing to define "dessert" in the broadest possible terms. This means that
gay rights will not be applicable in cases of ice cream, sorbet, decorative cookies, or
any other post-meal treats, be they sweet or savory. Tiny glasses of port and cheese
plates will also fall under the umbrella of "dessert" unless they are consumed before
the entree and defined specifically as "ap6ritifs."
Indeed, the following Term, the Supreme Court had to decide whether to rule on the same issue
as applied to a florist-Arlene's Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671, 2671 (2018)
("[R]emanded ... for further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop.").
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principles for genuinely held religious beliefs, 7 upheld Petitioner's
claim in this case. In contrast, Justice Kagan's concurring opinion,
which Justice Breyer joined, explicitly narrowed the determination to
one of discrimination by a state actor against Masterpiece and read
the majority opinion as embracing the conclusion that a state law "can
protect gay persons."8 The way the Justices used humor in the
Masterpiece Cakeshop oral argument is telling. Liberal Justices used
humor to engage in a dialogue with Petitioner and express their
skepticism, while conservative Justices did the same with Respondent.
This pattern raises some questions. First, is Masterpiece
Cakeshop representative, or is there something special about the facts
of that case (or cake?) that led to so much absurdist humor and
mockery? It may well be idiosyncratic, given that the average case
during the Roberts Court era has had only 2.74 instances of laughter,9
whereas, for instance, an argument addressing the inherently snicker-
producing question of nudity on television yielded twelve laughs in a
sixty-minute hearing. 10 Yet oral arguments on topics as dry as
standing in tax cases11  or jurisdictional issues in employment
discrimination law have inspired instances of laughter, albeit often at
just how boring the case is.1 2 Second, is laughter a function of
salience? Masterpiece Cakeshop was one of the most salient cases of
the 2017 Term, pitting antidiscrimination principles directly against
7. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 ('The outcome of cases like this in other cir-
cumstances must await further elaboration in the courts ....").
8. Id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring) (reading the majority opinion "as fully consistent
with" the view that the case was decided on the basis of prohibiting discrimination and empha-
sizing the narrowness of "its analysis to the reasoning of the state agencies" (emphasis omitted)).
9. Note that argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop was ninety minutes instead of the usual
sixty minutes, but that it still registered above the average number of laughs per minute. See
Oral Argument, Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 1.
10. Transcript of Oral Argument, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239 (2012)
(No. 10-1293).
11. For instance, in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125,
129, 141 (2011) (addressing whether ordinary taxpayers have standing to challenge a tax credit
as opposed to a governmental expenditure), Justice Kennedy joked, "But I must say, I have some
difficulty that any money that the government doesn't take from me is still the government's
money. [LAUGHTER]." Oral Argument at 32:11, Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (No. 09-987),
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts6/oral-argument-audio/22462 [https://perma.cc/U82X-
BFBC].
12. See, e.g., Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, in which Justice Sotomayor joked
during oral argument, "[I]f we go down your route, and I'm writing that opinion -- which I hope
not, but if I were -- [LAUGHTER]," and Justice Kagan joked, 'This would be a kind of revolu-
tion ... to the extent that you can have a revolution in this kind of case. [LAUGHTER]." Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 44-45, 50-51, Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017)
(No. 16-399).
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religious freedom claims in the newly recognized 13 and still divisive 14
right of same-sex couples to marry. Justices may be more engaged,
and thus inspire more episodes of laughter, in salient cases; on the
other hand, salient cases may generally be more somber, involving
high-stakes issues of fundamental rights and governmental powers. 15
Third, does the apparently tactical use of humor as a rhetorical tool in
Masterpiece Cakeshop indicate a broader trend? And if so, are judicial
comments that inspire laughter a good predictor of the voting
intentions of individual Justices or the Court as whole? More
specifically, we may ask whether it is typical that the Justices make
comments inspiring laughter primarily during the time allotted to the
advocates against whom they ultimately rule, or if laughter is
indicative of who will win or lose the case. If such patterns are
persistent, that suggests there is important information about the
outcomes of cases contained within the seemingly innocuous
parenthetical notations of laughter during Supreme Court oral
arguments.
In this Article, we set out to investigate these and other
questions relating to the use of humor and the nature of laughter in
Supreme Court oral arguments. Although humorous exchanges at the
Court are often discussed in the news media as they arise, 16 and a
couple of scholars have tallied up counts to determine which Justice
inspires the most laughter in a given Term,1 7 we are not aware of any
serious empirical investigation into the nature of laughter at the
Supreme Court until now.
In this Article, we take laughter seriously. Without doubt, the
comments that induce laughter in the Supreme Court gallery are often
humorous. But they are more than just humor for the sake of humor
or random lapses into absurdity. When the Justices make jokes and
quips, they do so with serious intent, and the humor that results often
13. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (recognizing that the fundamental
right to marry extends to same-sex couples).
14. In fact, a clear majority of Americans (62%) support gay marriage whereas only 32%
oppose it; however, only 35% and 44% of white and black evangelical Protestants, respectively,
and 47% of Republicans, support the right. PEW RESEARCH CTR., SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE GROWS, EVEN AMONG GROUPS THAT HAD BEEN SKEPTICAL 1-2, 6 (2017),
http://assetspewresearch.orgwp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/06/23153542/06 26- 17- Same -sex-
marriage-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU74-T6BE].
15. See infra Section II.B.
16. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, A Hypothetical President, Grammar Lessons & 'Beautiful' Hov-
ercrafts: SCOTUS Laugh Lines, NAT'L L.J. (Dec. 26, 2018, 12:30 PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/12/26/a-hypothetical-president-grammar-lessons-
beautiful-hovercrafts-scotus-laugh-lines/ [https://perma.cc/DR92-CJQM].
17. See infra Section I.A.
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stems from the barbed or pointed nature of their remarks. Indeed, it is
often the serious point wrapped within the joke that makes it
humorous. That does not mean that the laughter is incidental: humor
is one of the weapons in the Justices' arsenals of rhetorical persuasion.
In related work, we have shown that the Justices act more like
advocates in the modern era of Supreme Court oral argument than
Justices did in the past.18 Since the mid-1990s especially, the Justices
have talked much more during oral argument, leaving less time for
the advocates to make their points, and intervening predominantly in
the form of statements rather than asking questions. 19 At the same
time, the "disagreement gap"-the difference between the number of
words a Justice speaks to the Petitioner versus the Respondent in a
given case-has become a much more reliable predictor of voting
behavior on the Court. 20 In this Article, we show that the Justices' use
of humor is part of the same historical trend: it is performative,
contributing to the advocacy role that the Justices adopted during the
later Rehnquist Court and have continued to use during the Roberts
Court. Humor is a weapon of advocacy, and it is a particularly
powerful one because the advocates are unarmed against it-not only
by their formally inferior status to the Justices, but also because the
rules of the Court admonish them to avoid using humor themselves. 21
In order to take laughter seriously, we built a database of every
Supreme Court oral argument transcript from the 1955 Term to the
2017 Term and identified every episode of laughter therein. That is
over nine thousand instances of laughter, in 6,864 cases, over sixty-
three years. This empirical approach allows us to examine changes in
humor at the Court over time. We show that in an era of an
increasingly polarized Court, 22 the Justices are significantly more
18. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as Advocates, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1161 (2019).
19. Id. at 1203 (discussing the Justices' increased speaking time); id. at 1206 (discussing
the Justices' preference for statements over questions).
20. See id. at 1228; see also Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Predicting Supreme Court Votes
Based on Oral Argument Metrics, SCOTUS OA (Sept. 17, 2018), https://scotusoa.com/predictions-
preview/ [https://perma.cc/NY6R-RJWT].
21. Guide for Counsel in Cases to Be Argued Before the Supreme Court of the United States,
SUP. CT. U.S. 10 (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/guideforcounsel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6TW-4QGU] ("Attempts at humor usually fall flat.").
22. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SuP. CT. REV. 301 (describing the effect of political
polarization in recent decades as making the Court into an institution in which party and ideolo-
gy are closely linked, to an unprecedented extent); Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1234 (showing
empirically that the Justices have significantly altered their behavior in numerous ways since
Congress and the nation became more politically polarized after the 1994 Republican Revolu-
tion).
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likely to make laugh-inducing comments than previously, just as they
have a greater tendency to engage in other forms of aggressive
advocacy, such as the strategic use of interruptions. 23 Our empirical
methodology allows us to transcend the reliance on anecdote, folklore,
and supposition that characterizes some earlier academic discussions
of laughter. In so doing, we debunk the claim that the Justices use
humor as an "equalizer" with the advocates, to foster a de facto
egalitarian environment despite the structured hierarchical nature of
the Court. 24 On the contrary, we show that the Justices most often use
courtroom humor when they will eventually vote against the side an
advocate is representing, when an advocate is losing an argument,
and when an advocate is inexperienced. 25 The data shows that humor
is used far more as a tool of advocacy and a weapon against the weak
than as an equalizer or an antidote to the structured hierarchy of the
Court.
There is a lot of genuine humor in Supreme Court oral
arguments. Our aim is not to suggest otherwise, but rather to
understand laughter in the courtroom and the comments that
precipitate it as an aspect of judicial behavior worthy of more than
lighthearted review. Our analysis reveals patterns of judicial behavior
that belie the humorous context in which these incidents of laughter
are contained. There is meaningful information contained in the court
reporters' notation of when laughter occurs; information that goes far
beyond assessing the relative comedic powers of the Justices.
Laughter patterns tell us, for example, whether a case is likely to be
decided for or against the Petitioner. With lives hinging on death
penalty determinations and markets ready to fluctuate with the
determination of patent and tax cases, Court observers would do well
to take laughter seriously, as an indicator of likely case outcomes and
as indicative of the nature of the relationships between the Justices
and the advocates.
Part I establishes the foundations of our analysis: it describes
the prior literature and its limits; it then presents our qualitative
23. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1239 (showing that Justices interrupt advocates they
disagree with disproportionately more often than they interrupt advocates they eventually agree
with); Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Using Interruptions to Predict Supreme Court Cases,
ScoTUs OA (Oct. 22, 2018), https://scotusoa.com/predictable-gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/XM6W-
RNS8] (showing that the "interruption gap" is a very strong predictor for some Justices, particu-
larly Justice Gorsuch, for whom 86% of votes can be predicted based on his interruption gap).
24. See, e.g., Ryan A. Malphurs, "People Did Sometimes Stick Things in My Underwear"
The Function of Laughter at the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 COMM. L. REV. 48, 71 (2012). For more
detail, see infra Section I.A.
25. See infra Sections ILA, III.B, and III.C, respectively.
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analysis of the last seven Terms of the Roberts Court, 2010 to 2017; it
then outlines the data we use for our quantitative analysis; and
finally, it develops our hypotheses. Part II tests the first set of
hypotheses, examining how laughter at the Court has changed over
time and investigating variability among the Justices in causing
laughter. Part III tests the second set of hypotheses, examining in
more detail the notion that humor is used as a weapon, rather than as
an equalizer at the Court. It shows that the Justices use laughter
differently against advocates making arguments that they ultimately
vote for or against, against advocates who are winning versus losing
the argument before the Court as a whole, and against advocates who
are experienced versus inexperienced. Overall, it shows that laughter
is a weapon used against the disfavored and the weak. Finally, it
considers what it means to be the "funniest Justice" once the use of
humor is seen as a form of advocacy. We then briefly conclude,
contemplating both how Court observers should consider laughter in
light of our results and also what laughter tells us predictively about
cases that have not yet been decided.
I. FOUNDATIONS
This Part first considers the relevant prior literatures. It
describes the handful of works that have considered laughter at the
Court in particular, draws more broadly on theories of laughter
stemming from philosophy, psychology, and other spheres, and then
illustrates some of the trends we have identified regarding how
laughter is used in the courtroom. Second, it outlines the
fundamentals of our data, lays out our hypotheses and contending
theories, and addresses the reliability of the laughter notation by the
court reporters.
A. The Function of Laughter at the Court: The Limits of the
Prior Literature
In 2005, Jay Wexler had the novel idea of counting how often
each Justice made comments that were humorous enough to induce
laughter in the courtroom, as noted in the official court reporter's
transcript. 26 Wexler used a simple count of the number of such
26. See Jay D. Wexler, Laugh Track, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 59 (2005). The Court reporters make
the notation "(Laughter)" or some variant, such as "(A little laughter)." See infra Section I.C. To
maintain consistency, we have standardized all transcript notations of laughter as
2019] 1431
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laughter incidents inspired by each Justice in the 2004 Term, and
averaged those instances by case to assess the Justices' "relative comic
ability."27 Wexler conducted the same analysis again two years later.28
The findings sparked media attention 29 and some imitators, 30 and
even some mildly humorous reactions from the Justices themselves. 31
Wexler treated the project as a lighthearted inquiry, asking which
Justice "provides the best comic entertainment," and explicitly
rejected any aspiration to methodological rigor-he described his own
study as "profoundly flawed in almost every respect."32 But Wexler
was onto something more than just amusing Court watchers in need of
lighthearted distraction: looking at laughter at the Court has the
potential to reveal meaningful insights into judicial behavior and
advocate effectiveness.
Following on from Wexler, Ryan Malphurs sought to
interrogate the function of laughter at the Court.33 Malphurs drew on
the standard three-way categorization that philosophers and scholars
have developed to study laughter and which we discuss in more detail
[LAUGHTER]. Otherwise, we have reproduced the transcripts here exactly as they were tran-
scribed.
27. Wexler, supra note 26, at 59.
28. See Jay D. Wexler, Laugh Track 1 - Still Laughin!, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 130
(2007).
29. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, So, Guy Walks Up to the Bar, and Scalia Says .... N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 31, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/31/politics/so-guy-walks-up-to-the-bar-and-
scalia-says.html [https://perma.cc/F9YW-5P4L]. The work is still getting attention more than a
decade later. See, e.g., Kathryn Rubino, Who Is the Funniest Justice of Them All - This Term?,
ABOVE LAW (Nov. 4, 2016, 7:03 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2016/11/who-is-the-funniest-
justice-of-them-all-this-term/ [https://perma.cc/8Q6Y-86HE].
30. See, e.g., Lee Ross, Laughter at the Supreme Court, WKLY. STANDARD (July 7, 2008,
12:00 AM) https://www.weeklystandard.com/lee-ross/laughter-at-the-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/ JT53-8XM8]. Wexler keeps a yearly tally of laughter instances associated with
each Justice. Jay Wexler (@SCOTUShumor), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/SCOTUSHUMOR
(last visited Sept. 4, 2019) [https:/perma.cc/APC8-Z9DM]. For a time, DC Dicta kept a cumula-
tive weekly tally per Term, including examples of what it deemed to be the funniest line at the
Court each week. The Funniest Justice, DC DICTA (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://lawyersusaonline.com/dcdicta/category/the-funniest-justice/ [https://perma.cc/G7WB-
GRVR].
31. Justice Breyer is reported to have said of coming second in Wexler's study, something
along the lines of "being the second funniest [J]ustice is like being the shortest tall person." Jay
Wexler, SCOTUS Humor, WORDPRESS, http://jaywex.com/wordpress/scotus-humor/ (last visited
Sept. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9H6M-VDLG]. Justice Alito suggested that Wexler did the analy-
sis because he had "nothing better to do." Jay Wexler, Counting [Laughter] at the Supreme Court,
MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2016), https://medium.com/@BUexperts/counting-laughter-at-the-supreme-
court-b44a57dlafca [https://perma.cc/3DJ8-9D2A].
32. Wexler, supra note 28.
33. See Malphurs, supra note 24, at 53-55.
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TAKING LAUGHTER SERIOUSLY
below. 34 Any investigation of laughter at the Court must credit Wexler
for his insight that the incidence of laughter in the Supreme Court
transcripts was worth studying. Likewise, we credit Malphurs for his
insight that laughter is about much more than determining which
Justice is the "funniest" and for beginning to think about a typology of
the function of humor at the Court. However, as we explain below,
Malphurs's idiosyncratic methodology and baffling interpretation of
his own data led him to exactly the wrong conclusions about the
nature and function of laughter at the Court.
Malphurs addressed three popular theories of humor and
laughter. First, the "superiority theory," favored by Thomas Hobbes
and Ren6 Descartes, captures scornful or mocking laughter that takes
malicious delight in ridiculing the ignorance of others. 35 Second, the
"incongruity theory," particularly favored by psychologists and
philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Soren Kierkegaard, holds
that by defying our mental patterns and expectations, humor
surprises an audience, often with something absurd. 36 The resulting
laughter arises from the "mismatch between conceptual
understanding and perception."37 Third, the "laughter as relief' theory
views laughter as akin to a pressure-relief valve. 38 It suggests that
"laughter results from the expression and release of feelings caused by
stress" and nervous energy. 39
There are, however, a number of other theories of laughter
worth considering beyond superiority, incongruity, and relief.40 These
include other general theories, such as the "inferiority theory,"
exemplified by the Three Stooges and marked by self-recognition of
34. Malphurs, supra note 24, at 53. The standard analysis of categorizing the theories of
laughter into these three categories was first developed in D.H. MONRO, ARGUMENT OF
LAUGHTER (1963). For a critique of the three groupings as an oversimplification, see Aaron
Smuts, Humor, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://www.iep.utm.edulhumor/ (last visited
Sept. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7UW5-H8E5].
35. John Morreall, Philosophy of Humor, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entrieshumor/ (last updated Sept. 28, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/H3MN-V26F].
36. See John Dewey, The Theory of Emotion: (I.) Emotional Attitudes, 1 PSYCHOL. REV. 553,
558 (1894).
37. Malphurs, supra note 24, at 54 (quoting JOHN MORREALL, TAKING LAUGHTER
SERIOUSLY 18 (1983)).
38. Morreall, supra note 35.
39. Malphurs, supra note 24, at 54-55.
40. See, e.g., MARTA DYNEL, HUMOROUS GARDEN-PATHS: A PRAGMATIC COGNITIVE STUDY 42
(2009) (organizing fourteen theories of laughter into three families: cognitive, social, and psycho-
analytical).
2019] 1433
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silly antics, self-deprecating behavior, or modesty. 41 In addition, there
are theories based on biology, which considers laughter either an
essential element built into the nervous system or as an adaptive
behavior that becomes pleasurable when blended with sympathy and
affection; 42 ambivalence, by which "laughter results when individual[s]
simultaneously experience[] incompatible emotions" that struggle for
mastery within the individual;43 and configuration, whereby "elements
originally [seen] as unrelated suddenly fall into place," leading to
potentially amusing insights.44 One particular theory of note for our
study is the "punctuation theory," in which laughter is seen not as
interrupting speech but rather as punctuating statements. 45 On this
last theory, laughter does not occur randomly throughout the speech
stream, but rather emphasizes the ends of phrases, "akin to
punctuation in written [speech]," with humor often used strategically
for rhetorical advantage. 46 The Supreme Court's most notorious
humorist, Justice Scalia, was, by the account of many of his clerks,
quite strategic in his use of humor.47 This claim, and the associated
theory of strategic use of humor, fits with our thesis that humor is
often used as a weapon, deliberately used to critique disfavored
arguments or advocates.
Wexler's pioneering work on laughter had no theory of the
function of humor at the Court. He simply equated provoking laughter
with being funny: this is a reasonable assumption at a comedy club,
but we think there is more going on at the Supreme Court. Malphurs
only considered the superiority, incongruity, and relief theories; and of
41. See Robert Solomon, Are the Three Stooges Funny? Soitainly! (or When Is It OK to
Laugh?), in ETHICS AND VALUES IN THE INFORMATION AGE 179, 184-85, (Joel Rudinow & Antho-
ny Graybosch eds., 2002) (arguing that "[w]e enjoy [the Stooges'] petty plots of ambition, ire, and
revenge ... not because we feel superior to them" but because we are "similarly petty, vengeful,
and [when] viewed from the outside, uproariously slapstick").
42. Patricia Keith-Spiegel, Early Conceptions of Humor: Varieties and Issues, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMOR: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES 3, 5-6 (Jeffrey H.
Goldstein & Paul E. McGhee eds., 1972).
43. Id. at 10.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Robert R. Provine, Laughter, 84 AM. SCIENTIST 38, 41-42 (1996) [hereinafter Provine,
Laughter] ("The strong and orderly relationship between laughter and speech is akin to punctua-
tion in written communication."); Robert R. Provine, Laughter Punctuates Speech: Linguistic,
Social and Gender Contexts of Laughter, 95 ETHOLOGY 291, 296 (1993) [hereinafter Provine,
Laughter Punctuates Speech].
46. Matthew Gervais & David Sloane Wilson, The Evolution and Functions of Laughter and
Humor: A Synthetic Approach, 80 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 395, 400 (2005) (summarizing the punctua-
tion theory and other functional theories of laughter); Provine, Laughter, supra note 45, at 42;
Provine, Laughter Punctuates Speech, supra note 45, at 291, 293.
47. Infra Section III.D.
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these, he discounted the latter two explanations, arguing they were
unlikely to apply in the context of Supreme Court oral arguments
because moments of incongruity are rare and the audience does not
share the advocates' stresses.48 He premised his inquiry on the
assumption that the Court's adversarial nature meant that the
superiority theory was most likely to apply. 49 Despite expecting
superiority to explain laughter at the Court, Malphurs concluded the
opposite: that "laughter's function in oral arguments revealed the
Justices' willingness to reduce their power and control by diminishing
significant institutional, social and intellectual barriers, and allowing
others to laugh at and make light of them."5 0 For ease of discussion,
we will refer to Malphurs's conclusion as the "equalization" theory.
We disagree with both Wexler and Malphurs. We disagree with
Wexler because most of the Justices' comments that provoke laughter
are simply not humorous in any conventional sense. For ease of
exposition, we often refer to these comments as "courtroom humor,"
but the adjective is a significant modifier. As Adam Liptak of the New
York Times has pointed out, "what passes for humor at the Supreme
Court would probably not kill at the local comedy club."51 Even the
"jokes" that are recognizable as such are often pretty weak--Justice
Scalia's version of the time-worn "take my wife" joke is an apt
example. 52 The same observation explains both our disagreement with
Malphurs and why laughs are so cheap at the Court, at least for the
Justices. Justices do not need to be all that funny to provoke laughter
because the stress of litigation, the established hierarchy, and the
formal constraints of oral argument all mean that the courtroom is
primed to accept almost any deviation from expectation as a point of
humor.
In short, stress, hierarchy, and formality lend themselves to
absurdist humor, hyperbole, and laughter at breaches of protocol. For
instance, Justice Ginsburg simply saying the words "[b]ong hits for
48. Malphurs, supra note 24, at 54-55.
49. Id. at 54.
50. Id. at 70.
51. Liptak, supra note 29.
52. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402)
(Justice Scalia said, "A conviction eliminates your -- your marriage? Is that -- you don't have to
get a divorce, you just have to get convicted? That's a good deal. [LAUGHTER]."). The original
"take my wife-please," joke is credited to comedian Henry Youngman. See Mervyn Rothstein,
Henny Youngman, King of the One-Liners, Is Dead at 91 After 6 Decades of Laughter, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 25, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/25/artshenny-youngman-king-of-the-one-
liners-is-dead-at-9 1-after-6-decades-of-laughter.html [https://perma.cc/8X24-9UET].
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Jesus" is enough to get a laugh.53 Justice Ginsburg implicitly talking
about septuagenarian sex also seems guaranteed to bring the house
down, 54 the humor no doubt exacerbated by her age and propriety.
Similarly, the great pressure that the advocates are under to perform
in this prestigious domain lends itself to laughter as a way to relieve
tension, particularly when advocates or Justices goof or say something
that belies the seriousness of the forum. For instance, when the lights
went out in the courtroom during oral argument in Nichols v. United
States, the Chief Justice joked, "I knew we should have paid that bill.
[LAUGHTER] .''5 And the hierarchy at work makes jokes about the
superiority of the Justices and the inferiority of the advocates easy
fodder, typically at the advocates' expense. The Chief Justice's
comment in American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles is
typical of such exchanges.
Mr. Lerman: I don't think this Court needs to get
into single roads and I don't think
there's any reason --
Chief Justice Roberts: Well, I think you have to get into it
since I asked you a question about it.
[LAUGHTER] .56
Malphurs began with a laughter-as-superiority thesis but
concluded that the Justices in fact use humor to equalize their
standing with the advocates. 57 This transition deserves some
discussion. Like Wexler, Malphurs examined only one Term, the 2006
Term, 58 and based his conclusion on his personal belief that only three
53. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) (No. 14-144).
54. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-
556) (all Justice Ginsburg said was "[s]uppose a couple, a 70-year-old couple comes in and they
want to get married. [LAUGHTER].").
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2015) (No. 15-5238).
56. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 569
U.S. 641 (2013) (No. 11-798) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Am. Trucking Ass'ns].
57. Malphurs goes on to say that "laughter may be facilitating the judicial process by reduc-
ing barriers between [J]ustices and lawyers, creating a more effective and egalitarian environ-
ment for communication, and playing an essential role in their oral arguments." Malphurs, supra
note 24, at 71.
58. Malphurs et al. repeated the analysis for the 2011-2012 Term. Ryan A. Malphurs, Ja-
mie Bochantin, L. Drescher & Melissa Framer, Too Much Frivolity, Not Enough Femininity: A
Study of Gender and Humor at the U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2335613, [https://perma.cc/2QE6-Q3LM]. Malphurs repeated the anal-
ysis for the 2015 Term. Ryan A. Malphurs, The Day the Laughter Died: With the Passing of Jus-
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of the 131 instances of laughter he observed could be categorized as
"aggressive"; the rest he considered a "more good-natured form of
joking with advocates." 59 These distinctions were based on Malphurs's
own assessment of the tone in which the comments were made, 60 an
analysis that is highly subjective and difficult to replicate.
Furthermore, the bulk of Malphurs's analysis focused on the direction
of the supposedly nonaggressive laughter episodes: at whom he
thought the humor was directed. This categorization also involved
distinctions made largely on Malphurs's assessment of intent. For
instance, he distinguished between a Justice "critiquing other
[J]ustices" versus a Justice "teasing [an]other Justice,"' 61 without
explaining how one could validly or reliably distinguish between the
two.
At any rate, Malphurs's assessment of direction does not help
his conclusion: even accepting Malphurs's categories and his
subjective allocation of individual instances of laughter to those
categories, only 22 of the 130 laughter instances (or 17%) involved a
Justice making a joke at his or her own expense.6 2 In contrast, 65 of
the 131 instances (or 50%) were directed at other persons-be it an
advocate, another Justice, or a third party.63 In addition, the
remainder of the laughter episodes involved humor directed at the
argument being advanced; these arguably also amount to jokes at the
advocate's expense. 64 Consequently, using Malphurs's own subjective
assessment, 83%, or 108 of the 130 laughter instances he analyzed,
involved the Justices making fun of other people, primarily the
advocates. Put this way, it is hard to support the conclusion that the
Justices use laughter as an equalizing force.
tice Scalia, Who Becomes the New "Court Jester," and with a Possible Female President, How
Might a Majority of Female Justices Change the Court? (Apr. 30, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773026 [https://perma.ccW5PC-5YM7].
59. See Malphurs, supra note 24, at 59, 64, 68.
60. Malphurs assesses aggression in terms of whether a "[J]ustice uses a disdainful tone,
disrespectfully ridiculing the advocate" or being "clearly dismissive of an advocate." Id. at 63
n.12.
61. Id. at 66.
62. Id. at 64.
63. Id. at 64. When Malphurs et al. repeated this analysis for the 2011-2012 Term, they
found that a little over 10% of laughter episodes involved the Justices making jokes at one an-
other's expense, 48% were directed at the advocates' arguments, and 21% at themselves. Mal-
phurs et al., supra note 58, at 10. However, once again, that amounts to 38% of laughter inci-
dents being directed at third parties, a figure that rises to 71% if laughter directed at advocates'
arguments is included. See id.
64. See Malphurs, supra note 24, at 64, see also Malphurs et al., supra note 58, at 10 (noting
that 48% of laughter in the 2011-2012 Term was directed at advocates' arguments).
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B. The Function of Laughter at the Court: An Impressionistic
Taxonomy
Although our approach is largely empirical, in this section we
convey a richer sense of the nature of the laughter underlying our
data based on a systematic review of laughter episodes in the
transcripts. We read the transcript of every instance of laughter in the
courtroom attributable to the Justices between 2010 and 2017 (1,061
episodes).
Our first observation can best be summarized as profound
incredulity at Malphurs's interpretation of the oral argument
transcripts and recordings.6 5 Contrary to Malphurs's claim, we found
many instances of laughter arising from an implication of the Justices'
superiority over the advocates. 66  For example, when Assistant
Solicitor General Zachary Tripp claimed that the government was
"crushing" its goals to award government contracts to veterans under
the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act
of 2006, Chief Justice Roberts responded, "When -- I'm sorry. When
you say you're crushing the goals, that means you're meeting them?
[LAUGHTER]."67 Tripp had already clarified that by "crushing these
goals," he meant "beating them."68 The Chief Justice was simply
making a dig at the advocate.
This is not to suggest that the Justices have only one shtick. In
fact, we found plenty of evidence for each of the three major theories
about the cause of laughter. We observed numerous examples of
laughter reflecting incongruity, arising from both absurdities and the
surprising lack of fit between experience and expectation. Of the
latter, an example is Justice Breyer's willingness to defy expectations
by breaking the fourth wall, and his implicit reference to the
discretion that Justices have in relying on various precedents:
65. We are not the first to dispute Malphurs's subjective assessment of the meaning of
laughter during oral argument. Others have noted that the Justices frequently target the legal
profession and the advocates. See Ross, supra note 30. And one article analyzing instances of
humor in a particular case, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), considered that,
on Malphurs's theory, the laughs "should point toward some sort of inclusionary moment. Yet,
they do not." Nathan French, Laughter and the Supreme Court, REVERBERATIONS (Jan. 29,
2014), http://forums.ssrc.org/ndsp/2014/01/29/laughter-and-the-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/PSTV-KWS3].
66. For a similar impression, see Barry Sullivan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of
a Purpose: Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, October Terms 1958-60 and 2010-12, 2015
UTAH L. REV. 1005, 1075.
67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S.
Ct. 1969 (2016) (No. 14-916).
68. Id. at 42.
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Justice Breyer: Now, keeping that in mind, let's go back to
two old cases which are scarcely mentioned.
But old Supreme Court cases never die --
[LAUGHTER].
-- unless, luckily, they're overruled. And a few
have been. They're submerged like icebergs.
[LAUGHTER].69
Justice Breyer, the most whimsical Justice in our subjective
reading, also provides an example of incongruity through absurdism
in this interaction with Justice Scalia:
Justice Breyer: I just want an answer to my question. And,
for the purposes of this question, I am
assuming enormously in your favor. I am
assuming that this set of conditions is the
worst thing since sliced bread.
[LAUGHTER] ....
Justice Scalia: Sliced bread's supposed to be good.
Justice Breyer: No, no. It's been proved bad. [LAUGHTER]. 70
Likewise, laughter as a release valve is also common, best
represented by the many instances in which one Justice is confused
for another. This typically occurs when an advocate confuses one
female Justice for another, such as when Justice Kagan was confused
for Justice Sotomayor 71 or when Justice Ginsburg was confused for
Justice O'Connor, twelve years after Justice O'Connor had left the
Bench, to which Justice Ginsburg quipped, "That hasn't happened in
quite some time. [LAUGHTER]. '"72 But surely the most hilarious
incident was when Justice Kagan was confused for Justice Scalia:
69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No.
15-674).
70. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Koontz v. St. John's River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.
Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447).
71. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017) (No.
15-9260).
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)
(No. 15-474).
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Mr. Peterson: Justice Scalia, when Ramos-Bonilla adopted
the --
Justice Kagan: He's definitely Justice Scalia. [LAUGHTER].
Mr. Peterson: I'm very sorry --
Justice Kagan: And we're not often confused. [LAUGHTER].
Justice Scalia: It's a good question, though. [LAUGHTER]. 73
As mentioned, laughter resulting from relief is also found when
the Justices or advocates goof, such as here:
Chief Justice Roberts:
Justice Kennedy:
Mr. Maziarz:
We'll hear argument next in Kennedy v.
Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings
and Investment Plan. Mr. Furlow.
I'm sorry. We won't. [LAUGHTER].
It's still early in the term. Case 07-542,
Arizona v. Gant. Mr. Maziarz.
Do you have any views on the other
case? [LAUGHTER].
None whatsoever, Your Honor. 74
The notion of laughter as relief also explains why many
comments that induce laughter are actually quite difficult to sell as
humorous. Many not-very-funny courtroom laughs are much better
understood as relief of tension than comedy, such as when Justice
Sotomayor got a laugh by simply telling Michael Carvin to "[t]ake a
breath" in King v. Burwell. Sotomayor had already signaled she was
about to ask a new question, so Carvin was talking very quickly in an
attempt to finish an answer to Justice Breyer. 75
We found regular instances of all categories of laughter
described above, including those beyond the standard three that
Malphurs considers. Configuration humor, whereby elements that
73. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015) (No. 14-185).
74. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (No. 07-542).
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (No. 14-114).
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seem unrelated come together to produce an amusing insight, can be
seen in the Court's puns, which were particularly favored by Justice
Kennedy. An example: "In other words, what the statute does -- it's
phrased in terms of place, but it really has consequences as to time.
Einstein would have loved it: You can't define space without time.
[LAUGHTER]. '"76 And punctuation theory is commonly evidenced in
the many sarcastic jokes made by Justice Scalia, described below.
One of the most interesting of the other categories is
inferiority. It is our impression from reading over a thousand
instances of laughter over the last eight Terms of the Court that, at
least in the Roberts Court, there are many instances of inferiority
humor but the vast majority of them come from Justice Breyer. By far
the majority of his jokes involve either silliness or self-deprecation,
both forms of inferiority humor. Here are just a few examples of
Justice Breyer making a joke at his own expense:
Mr. Dreeben:
Justice Breyer:
Justice Breyer:
Justice Breyer:
So if you have an iPhone, Justice Breyer, and
I don't know what kind of phone that you
have --
I don't either because I can never get into it
because of the password. [LAUGHTER] 77
I mean, the -- I am told, perhaps I shouldn't
take this into account, but compared to the
Middle Ages with which I am more familiar --
[LAUGHTER].78
I don't have it in anything I've looked at yet.
But I have it somewhere in the back of my
76. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231 (2012) (No.
10-7387).
77. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, United States v. Wurie, 571 U.S. 1161 (2014) (No.
13-212). Wurie was argued immediately after Riley v. California, and the cases were consolidated
in the Supreme Court's ultimate opinion. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
78. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018)
(No. 15-1485) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Wesby].
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mind, which is sometimes wrong.
[LAUGHTER] .79
There were hundreds of examples of this kind of humor by
Justice Breyer that we could have used. Unfortunately, there is no
systematic way to code for self-deprecating humor, so we cannot
empirically establish that Breyer is exceptional in his willingness to
make fun of himself. But having read 324 examples of Breyer's
courtroom humor over eight Terms, we are confident in making this
characterization. 0 Other than Justice Breyer, only Justice Kagan
seems to be a regular exponent of self-deprecating humor. In a recent
search and seizure case, for example, Justice Kagan said, "[W]hen
looked at from the reasonable partygoer's view, there are these parties
that, once long ago, I used to be invited to -- [LAUGHTER]."81 Or take
this exchange from one of the arguments over the fate of the
Affordable Care Act in the 2012 Term:
Justice Breyer: I see the point. You can go back to -- go back
to Justice Kagan. Don't forget her question.
Justice Kagan: I've forgotten my question. [LAUGHTER].
Mr. Carvin: I was facing the same dilemma, Justice
Kagan. I --
Justice Ginsburg: Well, let me -- let me ask a question that I
asked Mr. Clement. It just seems --
Justice Kagan: See what it means to be the junior Justice?
[LAUGHTER] .82
79. Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080 (2018) (No. 16-
6795).
80. If we are right that laughter is mostly a weapon, the fact that we can establish these
results despite the person who inspires the second most number of laughs, Justice Breyer-see
infra Section II.C-being very self-deprecating means that the effect is even bigger than our
numbers will show, because it overcomes this contrary trend.
81. Transcript of Oral Argument, Wesby, supra note 78, at 28.
82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 91, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 567
U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-398) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs.]. United States Department of Health and Human Services is one of the consoli-
dated Affordable Care Act cases; the judgment is cited as National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2013).
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We do see occasional inferiority humor in the form of silliness
from other Justices, such as when Justice Kennedy quipped in a case
about throwing out fish as a form of destruction of evidence, "Perhaps
Congress should have called this the Sarbanes-Oxley Grouper Act.
[LAUGHTER]."83 But it was comparatively rare for the other Justices
to be self-deprecating in the selection of cases we read.
We do not interpret self-deprecating humor as a sign of
intrinsic humility on the part of any of the Justices, nor would we
attribute it to a desire to introduce some measure of equality between
the advocates and the Justices. On the contrary, when the Justices
make fun of their lack of familiarity with technology, the fact that
they do not get invited to parties, or their confusion about the facts of
the case, it is their faux-humility that makes laughter acceptable. We
also observe that there is often a sharper point beneath the surface of
ostensibly self-deprecating comments-when Justice Kagan remarked,
"See what it means to be the junior Justice?" she was simultaneously
making a joke at her own expense and at the expense of her senior
colleagues, calling attention to their tendency to interrupt her.
8 4
If Justice Breyer's predominant form of humor is self-
deprecation and absurdism, Justice Scalia's is clearly snark and
sarcasm, both of which fit clearly into the superiority thesis.8 5 Here
are a few examples of Justice Scalia's style of humor:
Justice Scalia: Wow. Wow, that's -- I mean, that's my
comment. [LAUGHTER].86
83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No.
13-7451).
84. See Transcript of Oral Argument, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 82,
at 91.
85. A rare exception is found in Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.:
Mr. Schnapper: In ordinary parlance, not everything an individual wears would be
referred to as clothes. There are examples of that in this courtroom:
Glasses, necklaces, earrings, wristwatches. There may be a toupee,
for all we know. Those things are not commonly referred to as
clothes.
Justice Scalia: I resent that. [LAUGHTER].
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014) (No. 12-
417).
86. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015) (No. 14-
990) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Shapiro].
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Justice Scalia: Oh, yeah, I'm sure that's what they all had in
mind. I have no doubt of that.
[LAUGHTER].8 7
Mr. Phillips: We're going to leave the status quo ante,
which means before the contracting officers
declared that there was a default under these
circumstances.
Justice Scalia: It's the "go away" principle of our
jurisprudence, right? [LAUGHTER].88
In the last example, Scalia returned to a comment that had
yielded some laughter twice earlier in the same argument, making
this his third use of essentially the same "go away" joke.8 9 Justice
Gorsuch, who was expected to be like Justice Scalia in other regards, 90
also seems predisposed to sarcasm. 91 In Sessions v. Dimaya, the
Justice got a laugh simply for sarcastically saying "[g]reat" in response
to the advocate's promise to answer his question after prefacing it.92
Other Justices use sarcasm too, such as when Chief Justice Roberts
cuttingly summarized an advocate's argument, saying, "It's only a
violation of the Fourth Amendment for two minutes, right?
[LAUGHTER] ."93
87. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913
(2015) (No. 13-894) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, MacLean].
88. Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478
(2011) (No. 09-1298) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Gen. Dynamics Corp.].
89. In the same case, Justice Scalia said, "We don't know what the answer is, so go away;
we leave you where you are," and, "So to say 'go away' means everybody keeps the money he
has." Id. at 48, 60.
90. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Gorsuch's Judicial Philosophy Is Like Scalia's - with One
Big Difference, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gorsuchs-
judicial-philosophy-is -like-scalias-with-one-big-difference/20 17/02/01/44370cf8-e881 1 1e6-bf6f-
301b6b443624 story.html [https://perma.cc/A8WM-4CAX] ("Gorsuch has ... expressed support
for a judicial philosophy much like Scalia's. Gorsuch shares the late [J]ustice's commitment to
statutory text and the original public meaning of the Constitution," though they differ on admin-
istrative law).
91. Others have noted the Court's increasing use of sarcasm in oral argument. See Sullivan
& Canty, supra note 66, at 1065-67.
92. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (No. 15-1498).
93. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37, Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 1 (2015)
(No. 13-9972) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Rodriguez]. Another example from the
same case came from Justice Scalia: "Mr. O'Connor: In your example, Mr. Chief Justice, if he's
pondering, then he's not being diligent .... Justice Scalia: Gee, we ponder all the time, and we
think we're being diligent. [LAUGHTER]." Id. at 16.
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While Justice Scalia, and perhaps now Justice Gorsuch, may be
particularly prone to use sarcasm and snark, this type of humor is
more representative of the Court's general approach than Justice
Breyer's self-deprecating jokes. A large portion of the laughter
attributable to the Justices followed comments made at the advocates'
expense. In general terms, these are typically examples of superiority,
but more interestingly for our purposes, they tend to be jokes about
advocate weakness, advocate inexperience, and the failure of
individual advocates to persuade the Justice or the Court as a whole.
Humorous quips and jokes emphasizing the advocate's weak position
are numerous and common to all the Justices on the Roberts Court,
except for the perpetually silent Justice Thomas. For instance, In
United States v. Tinklenberg, Justice Ginsburg told Assistant Solicitor
General Matthew Roberts, "I don't think you should have been so
happy with the way the argument was going -- [LAUGHTER]. ' 94
During the reargument in Jennings v. Rodriguez, Malcolm Stewart,
for the government, suggested that an alien who was being detained
for up to five years due to administrative delays "always has the
option of terminating the detention by accepting a final order of
removal and returning home." Justice Kagan responded, "I take it that
that's your most extreme answer because it doesn't sound all that
good. [LAUGHTER]. ' '95 In King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court's
second major decision on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care
Act, Chief Justice Roberts, referring to National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius previously upholding the individual
mandate, 96 said, "Mr. Carvin, we've heard talk about this other case.
Did you win that other case? [LAUGHTER].'97 And Justice Sotomayor
has asked multiple advocates some variation of the uncomfortable
question, "[H]ow would you like to lose? [LAUGHTER]." 98
The Justices also often joke about the weakness of specific
arguments as the advocate is trying to advance them. For instance, in
Bond v. United States, when Solicitor General Verilli said, "[I]t seems
94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, 563 U.S. 647 (2011) (No. 09-1498).
95. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204) (reargument).
96. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575 (2012) (upholding the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act under the taxing power).
97. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (No. 14-114).
Mr. Carvin represented the losing side of the individual mandate question in Sebelius. 567 U.S.
at 524, 540, 575.
98. Transcript of Oral Argument at 67, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)
(No. 16-402); see also, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-49, Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S.
87 (2013) (No. 12-609) ("Mr. Katyal, assuming the incredulity of my colleagues continues with
your argument, which way would you rather lose? [LAUGHTER].").
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unimaginable that a convention of that kind would be ratified by two-
thirds of the Senate, which it would have to be," Justice Kennedy
responded, "It also seems unimaginable that you would bring this
prosecution. But let's leave that. [LAUGHTER]."99 In Advocate Health
Care Network v. Stapleton, the Chief Justice took the wind out of the
Lisa Blatt's suggestion that Skidmore deference would be appropriate,
with his rejoinder that Skidmore "seems to be the principle [that] you
should defer to agencies when you agree with their interpretation.
[LAUGHTER]."100 And when an advocate in a Fair Housing Act case
said, "If you were to believe the statute's ambiguous," Justice Breyer
interrupted, "My goodness, if it isn't ambiguous, it would be surprising
because ten circuit courts of appeals have all interpreted it the way
opposite you and I take it you don't mean it's unambiguous on their
side. [LAUGHTER]."101
Examples also abound of the Justices reinforcing hierarchy by
putting an advocate personally in his or her place, as distinct from
commenting on the advocate's argument. This includes explicitly
reminding an advocate of his or her subordination to the Justices,
such as when Respondent's advocate said, "We don't disagree" and
Justice Scalia responded, 'You're supposed to say, 'yes, sir, good'.
[LAUGHTER]." 102 The Justices also use humor to call out the
advocates on flimsy or evasive arguments and responses. For example,
in the free speech case Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Justice Scalia queried
whether there was "a difference between the function of the sign and
the content of the sign?" 10 3 When Philip Sarvin responded, "In a literal
sense, yes," Justice Scalia answered, "Oh, I see. What sense are we
talking here? [LAUGHTER] Poetic? ' 10 4 In this instance, Justice
Scalia's sarcasm was so apparent that the courtroom laughed before
he had even given the punchline, "poetic."
Another common way that the Justices put the advocates in
their place is to remind them who has control over the process. For
instance, when Carolyn Fuentes posed a rhetorical question in United
States v. Kebodeaux, Chief Justice Roberts responded: "I get to ask the
99. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12-158).
100. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) (No. 16-74).
101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 939 (2015) (No. 13-1371).
102. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012) (No. 11-246) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument,
Patchak].
103. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (No. 13-502).
104. Id. at 53.
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questions. You don't. [LAUGHTER]." 105 And when an advocate in a
different case suggested, "I don't think this Court needs to get
into. . ." a particular issue, the Chief responded, "Well, I think you
have to get into it since I asked you a question about it.
[LAUGHTER]. "106 Similarly, when an advocate acknowledged, "I think
that would be a -- a more difficult case for us," Justice Gorsuch would
not let him avoid the hard question, saying, "No, no, no, no, no, not so
easy. [LAUGHTER]." 10 7 And when one advocate said, somewhat
redundantly, "I disagree with my friend," Justice Sotomayor jumped
in to tease him, saying, "I know you do. The question is how and why.
[LAUGHTER]."108 Similarly, she told another advocate, "I get that you
don't want to answer the question. [LAUGHTER]." 10 9
In contrast to the Justices, Supreme Court advocates are
afforded little room for comedy. As mentioned, the Supreme Court
Guide for Counsel warns, "Attempts at humor usually fall flat."110 One
experienced advocate, Thomas Goldstein, reported that this advice is
well heeded, describing humor at the Court as a "land mine," and
saying that an advocate is expected to act as a "straight man" to the
Justices. 1 Another highly experienced advocate, former Solicitor
General Paul Clement, agreed, observing that "the unheralded role of
the oral advocate is to play straight man for the [J]ustice."'1 2 Such
accounts raise doubt about the notion of laughter as an equalizing
force on the Court. However, every so often a joke at the advocate's
expense is deftly turned around by the advocate, such as on these two
occasions:
Justice Breyer: I've read the briefs fairly carefully, and
I'm still uncertain that I understand it
105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-45, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013) (No. 12-418).
106. Transcript of Oral Argument, Am. Trucking Ass'ns, supra note 56, at 12. Somewhat
more wittily, when an advocate responded to a question by saying that the Court had never ad-
dressed the issue specifically, Justice Kennedy jested, "[T]hat's why we've invited you to lunch,
so that you will tell us what the law is. [LAUGHTER]." Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13,
Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014) (No. 13-115).
107. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018) (No. 16-
1432).
108. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017) (No. 15-
1031).
109. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (No. 15-
1498).
110. Guide for Counsel in Cases to Be Argued Before the Supreme Court of the United States,
supra note 21, at 10.
111. Liptak, supra note 29.
112. Ross, supra note 30.
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Mr. Frederick:
well enough. That isn't your problem,
but it might turn out to be.
[LAUGHTER].
Well, let me address -- I think I -- let me
try to make it their problem.
[LAUGHTER] .113
Mr. Specter
Chief Justice Roberts:
Mr. Specter
I would respectfully disagree with that,
and I'll tell you why --
I thought you would. [LAUGHTER].
At least it's respectful. [LAUGHTER]. 114
More often, though, jokes by the advocates, particularly at the
expense of the Justices, are met with stony silence, even when they
are arguably funny. For instance:
Mr. Brooks:
Justice Kennedy:
Mr. Brooks:
I have many answers to that, Your
Honor, but the easiest answer is this.
The easiest answer is no --
Don't tell us we're not working hard
enough. [LAUGHTER].
I do recall, Justice Kennedy, that once
upon a time, the Court took 150 cases a
year. Maybe foreclosures could be
among them. 115
Here we have provided numerous examples from the last eight
Court Terms of the Justices making jokes at the expense of the
advocates, where the humor often stems from pointing out the
advocate's weakness, be it the overall case, the particular argument at
113. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498
(2014) (No. 13-461) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Aereo, Inc.].
114. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (No.
09-1233).
115. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct.
553 (2017) (No. 14-1055).
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hand, or the advocate's institutional weakness vis-A-vis the Justices. It
is not possible to systematically analyze the nature and direction of
humor at the Court in this Article-there is no digital humor dog for
the comically impaired to assist in recognizing the causes of laughter,
at least not yet. Nevertheless, in our empirical analysis, we are able to
ascertain certain trends that we expect will be associated with the
patterns in humor we have identified here. The aspects of laughter
that are objective and verifiable, which we discuss in the remainder of
this Article, confirm our impressions outlined so far: humor at the
Supreme Court is not an equalizing force.
From our analysis of eight Terms, we believe that laughter at
Supreme Court oral arguments does not tend to indicate lighthearted,
good-natured jesting. Instead, we believe the Justices use it as a
rhetorical weapon against their inferiors, as a form of advocacy
against counsel arguing a side they will likely oppose, or to indicate
that an advocate is inexperienced or doing badly. Obviously, we reject
Malphurs's equalization theory. But we also take issue with Wexler's
assumption that seeing which Justice uses courtroom humor the most
tells us who is the funniest Justice. It is potentially quite misleading
to equate courtroom humor with actual humor, wit, jocularity, or
whimsy. If we are right that comments leading to laughter are often a
tool of rhetoric used strategically by the Justices, then properly
understood, laughter at the Court is not about humor at all, but about
power and advocacy-part of what we have shown elsewhere to be a
broader trend of greater advocacy by the Justices. 116
C. Data and Methods
All prior studies of laughter at the Court have examined only
one year's worth of incidents. Looking at any one given Term of the
Court can yield unrepresentative results. For instance, the New York
Times repeated Wexler's initial study the following year and found
that it was not Justice Scalia, as Wexler had found, but rather Justice
Breyer who was the "funniest" Justice that Term. 117 To more
rigorously analyze the subject of laughter at the Court, we constructed
a database of the entire transcript of every case that came before the
Court between the 1955 and 2017 Terms. In our database, we examine
over nine thousand instances of laughter over sixty-three years of oral
argument. This broader set of data allows us to understand trends
116. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18.
117. Liptak, supra note 29.
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over time and to avoid making sweeping conclusions based on what
turn out to be year-to-year fluctuations. Our study also takes
advantage of more sophisticated methodologies: we do more than
simply count cases and rely on subjective assessments of judicial tone
or target. We are able to examine, for instance, whether laughter is a
sign that the advocate is doing well or badly. We are also able to
examine how the Justices are using laughter: if it is part of a strategy
to strengthen a position the Justice supports, or if some other
behavioral pattern can be discerned by studying the arguments.
Oral arguments offer an excellent means of studying judicial
behavior because Justices are relatively unguarded at oral arguments,
compared with the very careful crafting that goes into judicial
opinions and judicial speeches. The episodes of laughter that are
captured by the court reporters illustrate that relative comfort.
Whereas it is now quite common to observe laughter episodes during
oral arguments, with an average of approximately 2.76 instances per
five thousand judicial words during the Roberts Court,118 it is fairly
rare to see humor in written opinions. The few exceptions, such as
when Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissent from a denial of cert in the
style of a crime noir novel,119 are deliberate and polished, and
arguably suggest that the Justices may do well to heed the advice they
give to advocates and avoid humor. In contrast, at oral argument, one
can publicly hear examples of silliness, such as Justice Breyer saying,
'Your client's lawyer, namely you -- [LAUGHTER] ,' 120 or whimsy,
however pointed, such as when advocate Lisa Blatt said "Well, who
knows?" and the Chief responded, "I was hoping you did.
[LAUGHTER],"' 121 or even light-hearted childishness, such as the in
the following exchange:
Ms. Maguire [M]y very first sentence was, "This
case is about who gets to decide the
facts that trigger a mandatory
minimum sentence."
118. Infra Section II.A.
119. Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("North
Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin, Narcotics Strike Force, was working the morning shift.
Undercover surveillance. The neighborhood? Tough as a three-dollar steak. Devlin knew. Five
years on the beat, nine months with the Strike Force. He'd made fifteen, twenty drug busts in
the neighborhood.").
120. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Vasquez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1532 (2012)
(No. 11-199).
121. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct.
831 (2013) (No. 11-889).
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Justice Scalia: No, that wasn't it. [LAUGHTER].
Chief Justice Roberts: It started, "Mr. Chief Justice."
[LAUGHTER] .122
To examine the way in which humor is used during oral
arguments, we constructed a dataset drawn from the text of every
Supreme Court oral argument from 1955 to 2017. This database
contains 1.7 million speech events by Justices and advocates. 123 This
covers 9,378 episodes of laughter, 6,087 of which were triggered by the
Justices and 3,300 attributable to the advocates. 124 On average, there
were 1.32 laughs per argument-an average of 0.89 laughs
attributable to the Justices, and 0.48 attributable to the advocates-
but as we will show below, there is considerable variation over time. 25
On average, each argument consists of 250 speech events and about
five thousand Justice words, 26 but these numbers and the relative
contributions of the Justices and the advocates also fluctuate
significantly over time. 127
We supplemented that data with other sources of information
about the advocates and the Justices-such as judicial ideology and
advocate experience-as well as case outcome votes, individual
judicial votes in the cases, and the political and legal salience of the
cases. We conducted multivariate regression analysis to formally test
our hypotheses, and we also performed structural break analysis on
our key variables to confirm when critical changes occurred. But it is
not necessary to comprehend complex statistical analysis to appreciate
our results: we demonstrate all of our noteworthy effects with
122. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (No.
11-9335). Just prior to this exchange, Justice Scalia had asked the advocate to repeat the first
thing she said. Id. at 16.
123. By speech event, we mean all of the words spoken by a speaker until a new speaker
speaks: these episodes can be very short, or they may be extremely long. The transcript text we
derive from Oyez does not come preformatted into speech events; rather, it consists of "chunks" of
text and associated metadata. We wrote a separate program to thread those chunks into coher-
ent speech events.
124. There are some speech events that are not attributed to any speaker due to deficiencies
in the transcript. For those calculations where speaker attribution is necessary, there are 8,935
total episodes of laughter, 6,037 attributable to the Justices and 2,898 to the advocates.
125. Infra Section I.C. The medians on all of these figures are zero.
126. The average number of words spoken at oral argument was 10,059. In the modern era,
the Justices account for approximately half of the words spoken in any given case. In contrast, in
the 1960's, the advocates spoke approximately 80% of the words at oral argument.
127. See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1203 ("[T]he advocates have been consistently
speaking less over time and the [J]ustices are speaking more."); infra Section II.A.
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graphical analysis. This provides an accessible way for the reader to
visually confirm if significant changes were occurring, and if so, when,
and what caused them.
Our study rests on the validity and reliability of the 'laughter"
notation in the transcripts of oral argument. The court reporters
record when laughter occurs in the courtroom as a result of the
content of the oral argument. Laughter is typically noted on the
transcript as "[Laughter]," and sometimes as "(Laughter)." Very
occasionally, these notations are couched in a broader description,
such as "General laughter" (about 360 times), and there are a handful
of more specific references to "A little laughter," "Attempt to laughter,"
and "Audience laughter." We were careful to exclude references to
manslaughter and the slaughter of animals, neither of which is
intrinsically funny. 128
One unpublished manuscript has questioned the reliability of
the laughter notation. Malphurs et al. listened to the laughter
episodes of one year, the 2013 Term, and reported finding 61% more
instances of audible laughter than that which was noted by the court
reporters. 129 Malphurs et al. concluded that these discrepancies were
gendered in nature, with Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor having
200% and 133% more instances of laughter than recorded,
respectively, although Justice Kagan was below the average
discrepancy, with only 53% more instances.1 30 Some caveats should be
applied to this conclusion of bias. First, these numbers are very small:
Justice Ginsburg rose from 2 on the official count to 6 on the revised
count,1 31 from which it is hard to draw a reliable conclusion. Also, the
authors simultaneously seem to suggest that the effect results not
from bias but from the female Justices being less humorous, a
conclusion Malphurs also seemed to embrace in his most recent work
on the topic, 13 2 in which he also suggested that female humor is likely
to be different in nature since "females generally offer a more
nuanced, congenial, and face-saving critique."1 33
128. We used simple regular expressions (also known as "regex") text data-mining tools sup-
ported by the software application Stata 15 to conduct this analysis. See also supra note 26 re-
garding our standardization of the [LAUGHTER] notation.
129. Malphurs et al., supra note 58, at 6 (reporting results from listening for laughter during
oral arguments from the 2011-2012 Term).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Malphurs, supra note 58, at 7 (predicting that a "female dominated court," which could
result from a Hillary Clinton presidency, "would also likely produce fewer instances of humor").
133. Id. at 8. Note however that elsewhere, Malphurs suggested the opposite: that female
advocates may be involved in fewer instances of laughter because women are more likely to be
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Most importantly for the question of whether the transcripts
are reliable and consistent, Malphurs et al. report every instance they
observed of any laughter, "from chuckles to full-throated roars,"
whether from the audience, Justices, or advocates. 134 However, just as
the court reporters do not report audible asides among the Justices, 135
their job is not to report every titter that can be heard in the
courtroom, including chuckles from the Bench. The Marshal's office
reports: "Our reporters note when general laughter occurs in the
Courtroom if it is audible and clearly a reaction response to
something that was said officially during oral argument. They do not
note any laughter, chuckles, etc. from the bench should such occur."'136
As such, Malphurs et al. are measuring something different to
what the "Laughter" notation on the transcripts is intended to
capture: audience laughter in response to the oral argument.
Malphurs et al. are coming closer to capturing general humorousness
or levity by the Justices among themselves, a quite different inquiry.
In both the unpublished manuscript and his other work, Malphurs
emphasizes the importance of differentiating between humor and
laughter because some serious comments can provoke laughter and
some attempts at humor may fail to generate laughter. 137 We agree
with this analysis and so consider the expanded notation that
aggressive. Malphurs et al., supra note 58, at 12 ("It's possible that female advocates may ap-
proach oral argument with a more serious tone, since it is not uncommon for females to adopt a
more aggressive communication style to be well regarded within male dominated fields. These
more earnest female advocates could be less inviting to the [J]ustices' humor.").
134. Malphurs et al., supra note 58, app. A at 22-23.
135. An exception was where the court reporters did note Justice Kennedy saying as an aside
"Sonia is off' when Justice Sotomayor continued to question the advocate after his time had ex-
pired. Transcript of Oral Argument at 70, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292
(2016) (No. 15-274). This was remarked upon by Court watchers. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, The
Women Take Over, SLATE (Mar. 2, 2016), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/03/in-oral-
arguments-for-the- texas-abortion-case-the-three-female-justices-upend-the supreme-courts-
balance-of-power.html [https://perma.cc/P68D-5GHZ].
136. E-mail from Pamela Talkin, Marshal of the U.S. Supreme Court, to authors (Jul. 25,
2018, 14:17 EDT) (on file with authors).
137. See Malphurs, supra note 24, at 52 ("During Supreme Court oral arguments, labeling a
[J]ustice's or advocate's statement 'humorous,' as a result of the audience's laughter ignores the
potential for a serious comment to be misunderstood."); Malphurs et al., supra note 58, at 3
("[W]hile humor is a cognitive communication process, laughter is simply a manifestation of that
process ...") (citing VERA M. ROBINSON, HUMOR AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS (1991)). For in-
stance, in the copyright case American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., the following comment of
Justice Breyer's that we found funny did not get a laugh from the audience:
Mr. Frederick: I think that your argument, Justice Breyer --
Justice Breyer: It's not my argument. It's a parody perhaps, or an incorrect version
of your argument.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Aereo Inc., supra note 113, at 45.
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Malphurs et al. use to be less effective for the purpose of assessing
laughter at the Court than the court reporters' unamended notations.
One important aspect to understand about laughter at the
Supreme Court is that it rarely emanates from either the Justices or
the advocates themselves. Laughter, or at least the laughter that
makes it into the transcript, is the reaction of the courtroom gallery as
a whole. Sometimes the gallery erupts quickly, but more often it does
so after a brief pause. Thus, by the time the laughter reaches the
threshold of disruption that causes the court reporter to make a note
of it, the next speaker may have already begun speaking. This creates
a problem of attribution. We addressed this issue by attributing
laughter within the first or second word of a speaker's dialogue to the
previous speaker. Admittedly, this may still be over- and under-
inclusive in some cases, but our review of the record convinces us that
it is the appropriate general rule. Our initial search yielded 5,223
laughter notations attributable to the Justices and 3,864 to the
advocates; after this timing adjustment, those figures changed to
6,087 and 3,300, respectively. 138
In this Article, we have chosen to present the majority of our
empirical analysis graphically. Graphical analysis often conveys more
information than regressions and it is certainly more comprehensible
to the average reader. We have prioritized this method of presentation
to allow readers to make their own assessment of competing claims.
Where appropriate, we use regression analysis to confirm, qualify, or
even dispute the impression conveyed by the graphs. The details of the
regression analysis are primarily discussed in footnotes and in the
Statistical Appendix.
D. Hypotheses
Consistent with our prior work, we are particularly interested
to see if patterns in laughter changed in 1995, when the Justices
became significantly more active at oral argument and engaged in
greater forms of advocacy. In The New Oral Argument: Justices As
Advocates, we tested a theory about the changing nature of Supreme
Court oral argument and the degree to which the Court is influenced
by broader social and political contexts. We hypothesized that as
138. There is a slight discrepancy in these totals because the initial numbers undercount
laughter where an advocate's speech event begins and ends with laughter. In our model, the ad-
vocate is credited with the second, but not the first.
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American politics and society became distinctly more polarized in the
mid-1990s, so too did the Court:13 9
U.S. politics witnessed a sharp and sustained increase in political polarization with the
landslide Republican victory in the mid-term Congressional elections of 1994. The 'Re-
publican Revolution' that began in the subsequent 104th Congress brought a large in-
flux of freshmen Congressional representatives to Washington in 1995 who were unwill-
ing to be bound by traditional norms of seniority and bipartisan cooperation. 140
In The New Oral Argument, we showed that "judicial activity at oral
argument has increased significantly" in recent decades; 141 "that the
nature of that activity is directed toward greater judicial advocacy;"'142
and that this "new paradigm.., can be dated as beginning in" the
mid-1990s.143  Without definitively establishing causation, we
explained why political polarization was the most likely explanation
for the changing nature of oral argument.
We documented these changes in the nature of oral argument
by establishing a multi-faceted increase in judicial activity across
various behaviors at oral arguments around 1995, including the
number of words used, the duration of judicial speech, and the number
of judicial interruptions, among other measures. 144 Furthermore, we
showed that the increased activity represents activism in favor of the
side that each Justice ultimately decides in favor of and against the
side he or she rules against. 145 For instance, we showed that Justices
take up more of the time of the advocate they ultimately rule against
and disproportionately direct comments to that advocate, whereas
they direct questions to the advocate in whose favor they eventually
rule. 146 Elsewhere, we have used these patterns to predict case
outcomes, based on judicial behavior at oral argument. 147 At the start
139. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1162-63.
140. Id. at 1163.
141. Id. at 1163, 1202-12.
142. Id. at 1163, 1226-31.
143. Id. at 1163, 1237.
144. Id. at 1234, 1239.
145. Id. at 1243 tbl.5.
146. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Favoring Friend Versus Foe in Supreme Court Oral Ar-
guments, SCOTUS OA (Sept. 24, 2018), https://scotusoa.com/friend-or-foe/ [https://perma.cc/2EVF-
6LGL].
147. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 20; for an example, see, e.g., Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The
Importance of Empirical Analysis (with Forecasts of Bucklew & Madison), SCOTUS OA (Nov. 19,
2018), https://scotusoa.com/bucklew-madison/ [https://perma.cd/NBV9-DKL7] (predicting the out-
comes of Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (addressing whether it would be unconstitu-
tionally cruel and unusual to execute a prisoner for whom lethal injection would be exceptionally
painful, given his particular medical history) and Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019)
(addressing whether it would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual to execute a prisoner for a
crime he can no longer remember, due to a medical condition)).
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of this project, our prediction was that courtroom humor would also fit
this pattern; that is, we believed the Justices would use courtroom
humor to the disadvantage of advocates whose arguments they oppose
and to the advantage of those they favor.
Our view that courtroom humor is part of advocacy by the
Justices led us to expect specific patterns in laughter episodes: first,
we expected to see a change over time, with a significant increase in
the modern era for the number of laughter incidents, as the Court
became more performative. Second, in particular, we expected to see a
change before and after 1995, when political polarization shaped other
forms of judicial behavior at oral argument, as discussed. Third, we
expected to see patterns of advocacy emerge from laughter-inducing
behavior-we theorized there would be systematic differences in
which side of an argument prompts each Justice's laugh-inducing
comments. Fourth, we expected those patterns not to be focused on
equalizing, but rather focused on advantaging some and, importantly,
disadvantaging others. Furthermore, even when the courtroom humor
of the Justices was not closely tied to judicial advocacy, we expected it
to be used to reinforce the existing courtroom hierarchy. Thus, our
fifth hypothesis was that we expected to see an anti-equalizing trend
in the data, one that emphasized the Justices' top spot in the
hierarchy and the advocates' inferiority. We did not expect these
differences to be universal-we anticipated variation-but overall, we
expected these hypotheses to be borne out.
Throughout, we also paid close attention to whether a similar
change was discernible in 1986, since that was the year when Justice
Scalia joined the Court. Justice Scalia was declared the "funniest
[J]ustice" by Wexler, although that ranking is actually subject to some
year-to-year fluctuation, 148 and many believe that Justice Scalia had a
significant effect on every aspect of oral argument. 149 However, it is
difficult to disaggregate Justice Scalia's effect on the Court from other
significant changes that occurred in the mid-1980s. For example, 1986
was also approximately when the Supreme Court bar began to be
manifestly more concentrated and professionalized. The
professionalization and concentration of the Supreme Court bar began
148. See supra notes 26, 28, 31 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Erin Fuchs, Lawyer Who's Argued 73 Cases in Supreme Court Says Oral Ar-
guments 'Changed Completely' After Scalia, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2016, 8:24 PM) (quoting
Carter Phillips), www.businessinsider.com/scalia-death-oral-argument-supreme-court-2016-2
[https:/ perma.cc/FGA3-3LSX].
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with Sidley Austin hiring former Solicitor General Rex Lee in 1985.150
Lee "create[d] a Supreme Court and appellate practice [at] Sidley's DC
office," and firms such as Mayer Brown & Platt, Jenner & Block, and
Kirkland & Ellis quickly followed suit by recruiting talent from the
Justice Department and recent Supreme Court clerks. 151 A year after
Rex Lee moved to Sidley, and the same year Justice Scalia was
appointed, William H. Rehnquist was promoted to Chief Justice. 152 We
also note that in 1987, just after Justice Scalia joined the Court,
President Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork was rejected
after a confirmation hearing so controversial that "bork" became a
verb used to refer to ending a nominee's prospects. 153
Most statistical analyses cannot prove causation, only
correlation, but some correlations are more persuasive than others. If
a plausible theory yields a testable prediction-an ex ante
hypothesis-we should have greater confidence in the theory when the
prediction is supported by the data. In contrast, ex post
rationalizations of patterns that emerge from the data should be
treated with skepticism. For an alternative thesis to be given
credibility, such as the Bork explanation, there would obviously have
to be a logical relationship between the controversy of the failed
nomination and increasing laughter. That would be necessary but not
sufficient-in addition, the thesis would have to be something that
seemed credible ex ante, not simply a post hoc rationalization. Forging
a strong relationship between theory and empirics in this way is
essential in order to avoid post hoc rationalizations once empirical
trends have been discerned. We have no theory as to why Rehnquist's
promotion or Bork's failed nomination should have changed the rate of
laughter at the Court. On the other hand, the changing nature of the
Supreme Court bar does present us with a credible alternative to
explain changes in the use of courtroom humor in the mid-1980s. It is
plausible that as the atmosphere in the Court became more clubby
and exclusive, interactions between the Justices and the advocates
became less formal, more relaxed, and more humorous. For reasons
explained later in the Article, we ultimately rejected this thesis.
150. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transform-
ing the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489 (2006).
151. See id. at 1489-99; see also Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1165, 1191-92 (summarizing
the argument and showing it did not have a significant effect on most forms of judicial activity).
152. See Lazarus, supra note 150, at 1503.
153. See, e.g., Bork, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/bork (last visited Sept. 4,
2019) [https://perma.cc/MG4L-GXXC].
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So our first group of hypotheses concerned what has occurred
at the Court and why: we expected to see a significant increase in
laughter over time, as the Court has become more performative, and
we theorized that change is likely to have occurred most dramatically
either in 1986, 1995, or both. As well as hypothesizing about changes
in the laughter patterns, we also wanted to inquire as to what
laughter means at the Court. This focus gave rise to our second set of
hypotheses: although laughter is often equated with humor, we
believed that judicial jokes and jibes are likely to be strategically
directed, and not simply random. In particular, we predicted that we
would see more jokes made at the expense of advocates with whom the
Justice eventually votes against in the case at hand. Specifically, we
expected to see a "laughter gap" consistent with the "disagreement
gap" and "interruption gap" that we have shown elsewhere, whereby
Justices speak more and interrupt more during the time of the
advocate with whom they eventually disagree. 154 Furthermore, we
expected to see judicial jokes at the expense of more inexperienced
advocates and losing advocates-that is, that laughter caused by the
Justices is a sign of the weakness of the advocate against whom a joke
is made.
II. THE MODERN ERA OF LAUGHTER AT THE COURT
In this Part, we first examine whether patterns of laughter at
the Court have changed over time to test our first hypothesis that
comments inducing laughter, like other judicial activity, have
dramatically increased in the modern era. We then test when such a
change occurred and whether it should be attributed to the entrance of
Justice Scalia onto the Court (in 1986), the effect of political
polarization on the Court (significantly increasing in 1995), or the
more exclusive Supreme Court bar (starting in 1986).
A. Laughter as Performance: Trends Over Time
Our first hypothesis was that instances of laughter have been
increasing over time. Our earlier research showed that the Justices
are far more engaged in the modern era of Supreme Court oral
argument than in the past. 155 We attributed that engagement to the
Justices taking on an advocacy role and treating oral argument as a
154. See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18; Jacobi & Sag, supra note 20.
155. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1203.
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form of performance, by which they influence public opinion.156
Comparing oral arguments in the modern era to those in the past
leaves no doubt that interactions between the Justices and the
advocates have become more intense.157 We hypothesized that the
general incidence of laughter would increase over time with that
intensity. Listening to oral arguments from the late 1950s and early
1960s is quite tedious-there is little of the intense back and forth
that has come to dominate modern oral arguments. A back of the
envelope calculation supported this impression: of the over nine
thousand instances of laughter occurring between the 1955 and 2017
Terms, the Warren Court accounted for just 9% of laughter incidences
(885) despite covering 22% of our data measured by Term (fourteen
Terms). Laughter became significantly more common during the
Burger Court, which provided 19% of laughter episodes (1,743).
However, it still fell behind average, accounting for 27% (seventeen
Terms) of our time period. The bulk of the laughter occurred during
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: the Rehnquist Court saw 46%
(4,278) of laughter episodes, despite covering only 30% (nineteen
years) of our sixty-three-year study, and the Roberts Court witnessed
26% of laughter episodes (2,472) despite only covering 20% (thirteen
Terms) of the measured time period up to 2017. Thus, the modern
Court, the Rehnquist and Roberts eras, accounts for two-thirds of
laughter incidents, despite covering less than half of the time period
studied.
Furthermore, during both the Warren and Burger Courts,
there was more laughter in response to comments by the advocates
than those of the Justices. During the Warren Court, advocates
inspired 497 laughs, compared to 388 laughs for the Justices. In the
Burger Court, the numbers were almost even, 896 and 847,
respectively. In contrast, during the Rehnquist Court, the ratio was
reversed and far more divergent, with the Justices accounting for
2,901 laughs and advocates only 1,377. Similarly, during the Roberts
Court, the Justices inspired 1,942 incidents to the advocates' 530.
That means that looking at judicial behavior alone, the percentages
above are even more tilted in the modern era: the Warren and Burger
Court Justices accounted for only 6% and 14% of judicial courtroom
humor, respectively, whereas the Rehnquist and Roberts Court
156. Id. at 1165-66 ("The [J]ustices are not simply becoming more active at oral argument,
they are advocating.").
157. Id. at 1168 ("[O]ral argument in the past was a sedate and dignified affair where advo-
cates 'got up and told their story' relatively free from interruption, [while] in the present it is a
disjointed and fractious affair.")
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Justices accounted for 48% and 32%, respectively, of comments by
Justices inspiring laughter. Figure 1 below displays more detailed and
comprehensive information.
FIGURE 1: LAUGHTER OVER TIME, JUSTICES AND ADVOCATES,
PER FIVE THOUSAND WORDS
4-
3-
0
f 2-
.
0-
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.55 19 65 19'75 19 85 19 95 2005
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-. Advocate Speech Event Triggering Laughter
Figure 1 provides further support for our initial hypothesis,
showing a very dramatic increase in laughter episodes in more recent
Terms. It shows a three-term moving average of the rate of laughter
incidents inspired by the Justices and advocates as two groups. We
applied a three-year moving average to smooth out year-to-year
fluctuations and highlight longer-term trends. In order to assess
whether the Justices' behavior provoking laughter in particular has
changed, it was therefore appropriate to control for how much time
they spend speaking, relative to previous eras and relative to the
advocates. As such, rather than looking at raw numbers and
percentages, as above, Figure 1 is scaled to laughs per five thousand
words, to reflect the approximate average laughs per case-there are
roughly five thousand words spoken in the average oral argument. A
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very similar result is achieved when scaled to 250 speech events. 15
Normalizing the data in this way is very important in light of our
previous research demonstrating the dramatic increase in judicial
activity in oral argument since the mid-1990s. The extent to which
oral argument has changed is demonstrated by the fact that in the
post-1995 era, the Justices as a group speak for thirteen minutes more
on average in each case than they did previously.159 Setting aside the
fact that every so often an argument does not exhaust the full sixty-
minute window usually allocated, if the Justices are speaking thirteen
minutes more every hour, then the advocates must be speaking
thirteen minutes less. With the Justices speaking more, it seems quite
likely that they would garner more laughs than previously, and the
advocates fewer, simply by virtue of increased airtime.
Figure 1 shows the number of laughter episodes per Term in
response to comments by the advocates, represented by the dashed
line, and by the Justices, represented by the solid line. Looking first at
the dashed line, it is clear that the rate of advocate courtroom humor
has stayed remarkably consistent over time, with comparatively little
increase. In sharp contrast, the trend for the Justices is unmistakable:
they have dramatically increased their use of courtroom humor.
One way to think about the difference between the time trend
for Justices and advocates is to imagine all of the variation in Figure 1
averaged out to a straight line. The gradient of such a line of best fit
for advocate laughter between the 1955 and 2017 Terms would be
0.007. The gradient for Justice laughter over the same period would be
seven times greater, at 0.043.160 To elaborate: if these upward trends
158. When examined per 250 speech episodes, laughter instances by the Justices and advo-
cates over time show a very similar pattern:
6-
0-
19 55 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2010
Tern
- Justice Speech Event Triggering Laughter
- - - - - Advocate Speech Event Triggelng Laughter
159. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1203, 1234.
160. Both estimations are significant at the p<0.00 level.
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were completely linear, we would see an extra laugh attributable to
the Justices per case after every twenty-three years, but it would take
142 years to reach the same increase for advocates. 161 Thus, clearly,
something is changing at oral argument that affects the Justices and
the advocates differently.
In terms of when the change in the rate of laughter at oral
argument occurred, the most noticeable upward shift arose in 1989.
Since that time, rates of laughter inspired by the Justices have
consistently remained at the higher level of approximately three
laughs per five thousand words spoken by the Justices. The change
appears to be a fairly sudden and stable jump upwards at 1989,
although the overall trend is a gradual upward sloping line. While
there was a further jump upwards after 1995, this graph does not
provide strong support for the polarization thesis vis-A-vis laughter. It
does support the Scalia thesis to some extent-the increase is
certainly not apparent in 1986, but it is not difficult to imagine that it
could take a few years for a Justice to hit his or her stride. 162
Even though the professionalization of the Supreme Court bar
occurred at roughly the same time Justice Scalia joined the Court,
Figure 1 nonetheless enables us to differentiate between the two
hypothesized simultaneous causes. The fact that the advocate
laughter changed so much less than Justice laughter in the late 1980s
undermines the Supreme Court bar explanation: if the increase in
laughter was a product of the more exclusive club that the Court
became, we would not expect to see a seven-to-one ratio between the
increase in Justice and advocate laughter. As such, whereas elsewhere
we have shown that Justice Scalia's impact on oral argument is mostly
overstated in regard to other Court behavior, 16 3 Figure 1 provides
some preliminary support for the Scalia thesis as it pertains to
laughter-albeit with a delayed effect.
161. Similar results hold in regression estimations using alternate measures, such as laugh-
ter per 250 speech events and the raw number of laughs per term. The authors are happy to pro-
vide details of unreported regressions upon request, but in this case, they add very little to clear
graphical analysis.
162. For instance, we showed elsewhere that Chief Justice Roberts significantly increased
his role as the referee of oral arguments after taking the first few years to settle in. Tonja Jacobi,
Gendered Interruptions at the Court: Looking Forward and Backward, SCOTUS OA (Aug. 2,
2018), http://scotusoa.com/gendered-interruptions-at-the-court/ [https://perma.cc/7ANA-6DSN].
163. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1191 (showing that 1986 was not associated with signif-
icant increases in judicial words spoken, duration of judicial speech, judicial interruptions, or
judicial questions and that the only area where 1986 showed a significant increase was the num-
ber of comments made to advocates, concluding that "it seems likely that his recent death in
2016 may have led to an outsized estimation of his role as an agent of change on the Supreme
Court").
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Rather than concentrating exclusively on either the long-run
trends or on particular Justices, it is helpful to examine the trend over
time in terms of historical eras of the Supreme Court. Table 1 divides
the data into four eras: 1955-1969, 1970-1985, 1986-1995, and 1996-
2017. The 1955-1969 era was the sole period of liberal dominance on
the Court;164 it was also a time in which oral arguments were
ordinarily two hours instead of one hour. 165 The 1970-1985 era
captures the remainder of the Burger Court. The 1986-1995 era
coincides with Justice Scalia entering the Court and Rehnquist
becoming Chief Justice. Finally, the 1996-2017 era begins with the
dramatic increase in political polarization of the mid-1990s and takes
us up to the present day.
TABLE 1: JUDICIAL- AND ADVOCATE-INSPIRED LAUGHTER,
MEAN PER ARGUMENT FOR FouR COURT ERAS
Justices Advocates
Speech Speech
Era Laughter Events Words Laughter Events Words
1955-1969 0.23 151 2,613 0.30 174 1,0767
1970-1985 0.35 87 1,625 0.37 121 7,096
1986-1995 1.15 97 2,301 0.67 115 6,115
1996-2017 2.16 120 3,658 0.70 125 5,885
164. In 1969, the conservative Chief Justice Burger replaced the liberal Chief Justice War-
ren, a switch that not only made the head of the Court conservative, but also brought the aver-
age Martin-Quinn ideology score for the Court as a whole to above zero for the first time since
1960, one measure of the Court becoming conservative. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn,
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court,
1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 135 (2002). Updated data is available at Martin-Quinn Scores:
Measures, U. MICH. C. LITERATURE, SCI. & ARTS, https://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu/measures.php
(last visited June 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AJT7-DVK2]. Arguably, the Court became con-
servative not in 1969 but in 1970, when Justice Blackmun joined the Court and became the fifth
conservative of the nine Justices. Either way, putting the cutpoint at 1970 captures that shift on
the Court.
165. See CLARE CUSHMAN, COURTWATCHERS: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS IN SUPREME COURT
HISTORY 124 (2011). The rule was changed in 1970. Id. at 126; see SUP. CT. R. 28(3) ("Unless the
Court directs otherwise, each side is allowed one-half hour for argument.").
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Table 1 shows the number of laughter episodes inspired by the
Justices and the advocates separately in each era. It also shows the
average number of speech events and words attributable to each
group. The figures for laughter, speech events, and words are each
normalized on a per-argument basis and divided between the Justices
as a group (on the left) and the advocates as a group (on the right).
As Table 1 clearly shows, the number of Justice laughs in a
given argument has been consistently increasing throughout the four
eras, although not at a consistent pace. To make sure that this
apparent increase is not simply an artifact of Justices speaking more
over time, we can examine the number of Justice laughs as a
proportion of the number of Justice words and normalize to a base of
five thousand. 166 Prior to 1986, there were on average 0.76 laughs per
five thousand words spoken by the Justices, whereas the comparable
figure in the period from 1986 onwards (until 2017 in our data) is 2.8
laughs per five thousand words. Looking at the pre-1986 period more
closely, there were an average of 0.42 Justice laughs per five thousand
words during the Warren Court and early Burger Court (1955-1969)
and 1.08 per five thousand words during the remainder of the Burger
Court (1970-1985). In the early Rehnquist Court (1986-1995), that
figure rose to 2.53 Justice laughs per five thousand words. The ratio
increased slightly, to 2.92 Justice laughs per five thousand words, in
the post-1995 era of the late Rehnquist and early Roberts Courts
(1996-2017). Thus, while there has been a consistent upward trend
across all eras, the biggest change is between the earlier and later
Courts.
The question remains: Did that change occur in 1986, when
Justice Scalia joined the Court; in 1989, as the graph suggests; in the
mid-1990s, as our analysis of other trends in oral argument would
suggest; 16 7 or some other time period? To determine exactly when the
biggest change took place, we performed a structural break analysis
on both Justice and advocate comments inspiring laughter, in absolute
terms and normalized in relation to the number of speech episodes
and, alternately, the number of words spoken. There are essentially
two ways to do this analysis: to specify a time at which the change is
theorized to have occurred, and see if there is a significant difference
before and after that time; or to not specify such a time and let the
166. Five thousand words per argument is a compromise between a slightly high estimate for
the Justices as a group and a slightly low one for the advocates.
167. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1234, 1243.
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computer program find the point in time that has the most significant
change associated with it. We did both.
When we tested for expected breaks at 1986 and 1995, both
were significant; an analysis allowing for structural breaks at both
points was also significant and more powerful than each alone. Using
the unguided structural break method in the Wald test, which
assumes a single break at an unknown point in the data, we rejected
the null hypothesis that there was no break at any time. That is
unsurprising, given the dramatic increase shown in Figure 1. The
program's unguided best guess at the break points for the Justices
were: in absolute numbers of laughs, 1989; in laughs per speech
episode, 1989; and in laughs per five thousand words, 1969. For the
laughter associated with the advocates, those same numbers were:
1994, 1988, and 1988, respectively. All breaks were highly statistically
significant. Overall, then, the two types of break test both mostly
pointed in the direction of the late 1980s, 1986, or 1989. Just like
eyeballing Figure 1, these more sophisticated tests suggest that the
most significant increase in laughter at oral argument was sometime
between 1986 and 1989. This supports the Scalia thesis, albeit
potentially with a two- to three-year delay.
To augment the structural break analysis, then, we included
dummy variables for post-1986 and post-1995 in a set of multivariate
logistic regressions that also included a general time variable, and
found that both 1986 and 1995 were significant.168 In similar
regressions focusing on laughter by the advocates, both the post-1986
and post-1995 dummy variables are statistically significant. However,
although both significant, they actually point in different directions.
The odds ratio for post-1986 is substantially greater than one,
meaning that after 1986, advocate laughter became more likely,
holding all other variables constant. In contrast, the odds ratio for
post-1995 is substantially less than one, meaning that in an era of
intense political polarization, from 1995 to the present, advocate
laughter at oral argument became less likely, holding all other
variables constant. 169
The results for both Justices and advocates provide much
stronger support for the post-1995 effect than the previous analysis
suggested. For advocates, in the post-1995 period, not only was there a
168. For the Justices, the post-1986 dummy variable was significant at the .01 level and the
post-1995 dummy variable was significant at the 0.05 level. See infra Statistical Appendix, Mod-
el 1, Models 3-4. These regression models are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this
Article.
169. See infra Statistical Appendix, Model 5.
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statistically significant effect in the direction predicted, but it reversed
an earlier change in the opposite direction. This is consistent with our
earlier work showing that political polarization had a critical effect on
the Court. The results also make the interpretation of the post-1986
effect more ambiguous. Clearly, 1986 was significant, either because of
the entrance of Justice Scalia onto the Court or because of the change
in the Supreme Court bar, or both. But the fact that advocate-inspired
laughter and Justice-inspired laughter move in the same direction in
the 1980s but in divergent directions in the 1990s suggests that the
overall phenomenon we are identifying is more a product of political
polarization than the two 1986 effects. 170 This adds to our general
skepticism that changes in the nature of oral argument can be
attributed to any individual, rather than a broader institutional
change.
B. Laughter as Performance: Salient Cases
In keeping with our laughter-as-advocacy theory, we also
examined the relationship between laughter and case salience. There
are two commonly used measures of the importance of Supreme Court
cases in the law and courts literature. The first measure is a proxy for
public interest; it counts a case as salient if it was mentioned on the
front page of the New York Times.171 The second measure is a proxy
for legal importance; this measure, published in the Congressional
Quarterly, "is based on experts' retroactive assessment of whether a
case was a landmark decision. 172 It is convenient to think of the two
measures in terms of political salience (measured contemporaneously
with the decision) and legal salience (measured retrospectively).
Looking at the raw data, there is a significant difference
between the average quantities of laughter in salient versus
nonsalient cases. There is more laughter in salient cases under both
the political and legal measures. Over the entire period of our study,
170. Advocate-inspired laughter is a different phenomenon than Justice-inspired laughter,
one requiring more detailed analysis than space allows here to determine if the shift in advocate
behavior in the 1980s came about from oral arguments becoming more clubby, with that trend
subsequently reversed by political polarization. Here we are focusing primarily on Justice-
inspired laughter; in a future project, we will explore advocate behavior in more detail.
171. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72
(2000).
172. Adam Bonica et al., Influence and Ideology in the American Judiciary: Evidence from
Supreme Court Law Clerks 18 n.21 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
790, 2017), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cg/viewcontent.cgi?article=2449&context=law-
and-economics [https://perma.ccVKF9-EP36].
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there were an average of 1.12 Justice laughs per case in politically
salient cases and only 0.73 otherwise. 173 Likewise, there were an
average of 1.68 Justice laughs per case in legally salient cases and
only 0.74 otherwise. 174 Regression analysis also confirms the
importance of both political and legal salience. Both measures of
salience are statistically significant in multivariate logistic regression,
with additional independent variables discussed in subsequent
sections of this Article. 175 This result holds regardless of whether the
dependent variable is Justice laughter1 76  or Justice laughter
normalized by the number of words spoken.1 77
C. Variation Among the Justices: Who is the "Funniest"?
We saw in the first Section of this Part that the rate of laughter
at Supreme Court oral argument has dramatically increased, and that
the increase is largely attributable to changes in judicial behavior.
This supports our first hypothesis, that laughter is increasing in the
modern era as the Justices see their role as more performative than
ever. These results are also tentatively consistent with our second
hypothesis, and our broader findings in other work, that political
polarization has increased judicial advocacy in the form of this
performance. We say "tentatively consistent" because although the
data supports the theory that there was a significant change in the
incidence of laughter at oral argument in the mid-1990s corresponding
with our current era of intense political polarization, the data even
more strongly supports the view that the most significant change
occurred in the mid-to-late 1980s and that a structural break centered
on 1995 was only of secondary importance. This finding is interesting
when contrasted with our previous research that very strongly
indicated that the increase in judicial activity, which characterizes
what we term "the new oral argument," was a function of increasing
political polarization in the mid-1990s. In our earlier work, we largely
173. We confirmed that this difference is significant at the 0.01 level using a t-test.
174. Again, we confirmed that this difference is significant at the 0.01 level using a t-test.
The same pattern holds true in terms of advocate laughter episodes. There were an average of
0.73 and 1.02 advocate laughs per case in politically and legally salient cases, respectively, and
only 0.42 and 0.44 otherwise.
175. These variables relate to agreement with the advocate (Agreement), whether the advo-
cate speaking won the case (Winner), and advocate experience categories (Novice and Hero).
They also include the time trend variable (Term), and the dummy variables for post-1986 and
post-1995 (Post1986, Post1995) discussed above.
176. See infra Statistical Appendix, Model 1.
177. See infra Statistical Appendix, Model 4 (normalized by five thousand words spoken).
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debunked the theory that Justice Scalia had a transformative effect on
oral argument. 178 We must concede, based on the evidence presented
so far at least, that there is considerably more support for the notion
that Justice Scalia changed the comedic tone of the Court.
In the next Part, we explore the polarization thesis in much
greater detail and find considerably stronger support for it. But now
we pause to consider Justice Scalia's role in more detail. Taking a
closer look at the rate of laughter associated with each individual
Justice and analyzing the time trend for each Justice confirms that
Justice Scalia played a significant role in the increased incidence of
laughter, but it also suggests that his influence was by no means
dominant.
To begin this analysis, Figure 2 ranks the Justices in order of
the frequency by which they inspire laughter in the Courtroom.
178. The only significant impact Justice Scalia had was the large increase in the number of
comments directed at advocates, in lieu of questions, an effect that does go to the heart of Justic-
es behaving as advocates, and so Justice Scalia can take some credit for that dubious honor. See
Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1243.
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FIGURE 2: MEAN LAUGHTER PER ORAL ARGUMENT,
BY JUSTICE, 1955-2017
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Figure 2 shows it was the New York Times, rather than
Wexler, who happened upon an outlier Term when it found that
Justice Breyer was the most laugh-inducing Justice. Overall, Justice
Scalia is clearly number one, independently responsible for
approximately two-thirds of one laugh per oral argument on average.
However, the Figure also shows that Justice Scalia was not as much of
an exception as some may claim. 17 9 Justice Breyer is not far behind,
responsible for more than one laugh in every two oral arguments. As
such, it is not surprising that the New York Times found Justice
Breyer to be the "funniest Justice" in the 2005 Term. And the current
Chief Justice is also honing his skills in this regard, responsible for
almost one laugh in every other argument, and as we will see below,
gaining in the rankings over time.
Of particular interest, we note that Justice Gorsuch, who has
only been on the Court for less than two Terms in our data (which
does not yet include the 2018 Term) comes in fourth place. This raises
doubts about attributing the cutpoint in the laughter increase at the
1989 Term to a delayed effect of Justice Scalia-Justice Gorsuch, at
any rate, does not appear to have needed much time to bring his own
unique brand of humor out into the open. The second noteworthy
appearance is Justice Frankfurter, coming in at number five. He is the
only Justice from the earlier part of our data set who mirrors the
behavior of the modern Justices. Justice Frankfurter is an outlier for
his era in other respects; he also spoke much more than any other
Justice on the Court until the 1980s. Both these findings are
consistent with Justice Frankfurter's reputation for domineering
behavior: his badgering and bullying is even said to be responsible for
the nervous breakdown of Justice Whittaker.180 Once again, Justice
Frankfurter's appearance in the top ranks of the Justices on the
laughter scale, then, is an obvious challenge to the notion of laughter
as an equalizing force on the Court. The third noteworthy Justice
appearing at the top is Justice Kagan-her presence here belies the
179. For example, President Barack Obama described Justice Scalia as having an "incisive
wit." Nolan D. McCaskill, The 11 Most Memorable Scalia Quotes, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 2016, 12:59
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/20 16/02/best-antonin-scalia-quotes- 219274 [https://perma.cc/
KA6Q-FWME]. SCOTUSblog opined that "his many memorable quips from the bench, usually
during oral argument, are also an important part of his legacy." Mark Walsh, A "View" from the
Courtroom: "I'm Scalia" and Other Quips, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2016, 3:45 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/a-view-from-the-courtroom-im-scalia-and-other-quips/
[https://perma.cc/56GX-LRRH].
180. The Political Thicket, WNYC STUDIOS (June 9, 2016),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/the-political-thicket [https://perma.cc/2MEC-7DYL] (describ-
ing how negotiations over Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) pushed Justice Whitaker to a nerv-
ous breakdown and eventually led Justice Frankfurter to the hospital).
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claim of Malphurs et al. that women, at least on the Supreme Court,
are just not funny.
The next Figure looks at how often each Justice inspires
courtroom laughter in terms of the individual trendline for each
Justice over time. This allows us to pay greater attention to each
Justice, to see not only their overall ranking, but their progression.
For instance, while not every Justice in the current era has been
consistently "funny," if indeed that is what laughter at the Court
represents, every Justice save three has had at least one somber Term
where his or her rate of laughter was less than 0.1 per argument. The
exceptions are Justices Breyer and Gorsuch, and Chief Justice
Roberts.181 But Figure 3 also starkly illustrates just how consistent
the overall change for the Court was over time-the comparison
between the two earlier and the two later Courts is very stark indeed.
181. The lowest per argument rates of laughter for those three Justices are 0.14, 0.20 and
0.24, respectively. Justice Scalia's comic nadir was a mere 0.07. Note that the figure for Justice
Gorsuch may be an artifact of the limited data available.
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FIGURE 3: JUSTICE BEHAVIOR OVER TIME AND BY ERA
FIGURE 3.A: JUSTICES WHO LEFT THE COURT PRIOR TO 2000
Black Frankfurter
1IS .. 1.5 ,
0- ---- 0
1955 1960 1965 1970 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962
Term Term
Clark Warren
1.5
_ .5
0
1955 1960 1965
Term
Brennan
1.5
0-
1940 140 1970 190 19W
Term
White
1960 19 90 1990
Term
Marshall
1.5
Term
S Powell
S.5
0-
1970 1975 1960 19 19
Term
0
1955 1960 1965 1970
Ter,
Whittaker
1.5
0 ,
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Term
Goldberg
1.5-
0-
1962 1963 1964
Term
Burger
1.50
Si
.5-
0
1970 1975 1980 1995
Term
Douglas
0-
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Term
Harlan
1.5-
1i
S.5-
0 .
1955 1960 1965 19 70
Term
Stewart
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Term
Fortas
1.59
S.5-
0-
1965 1966 1967 1968
Term
Blackmun
1.5-
a1-
.5-
0 ....... e.
197019751980198519901995
Term
TAKING LAUGHTER SERIOUSLY
FIGURE 3.B: JUSTICES WHO LEFT THE COURT AFTER 2000
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Looking at Figure 3.A, we see only minimal variation. As
discussed, Justice Frankfurter was an outlier for this time. Justice
Marshall was also unusually active among his colleagues on the
Warren Court, but note that he particularly increased his rate of
laughter-inspiring episodes in the late 1980s. Justice White showed a
similar trend, with an increase in laughter episodes manifesting again
in the late 1980s and continuing throughout the early 1990s. These
two Justices18 2 lend support to the claim that much of the change we
are seeing is institutional, rather than an idiosyncratic change
resulting from one unusual individual.
What is even more striking than the change in behavior of
individual Justices is that, other than these three Justices mentioned,
the other thirteen Justices in the earlier era shown in Figure 3.A
consistently show very little courtroom humor. The "worms" that track
their behavior over time are practically straight lines that lie near
zero-if these results were EKGs, we would worry that the patients
were dead.
In contrast, in Figure 3.B, covering the later Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts, there is considerable variety in judicial behavior on
the laughter scale. Of all the Justices who were on the Court in this
century, it is the three with consistently low levels of laughter who are
the outliers. Justice Thomas's almost-zero level of laughter-inducing
episodes is no doubt unsurprising to most, since he barely speaks,
averaging only three words per oral argument over the course of his
career.18 3 The other two low fliers appear to be Justice O'Connor and
Justice Ginsburg. The latter in particular may be surprising to some.
Justice Ginsburg is probably the most personally idealized Justice of
all time, with extensive paraphernalia sold depicting her making all
182. Justice Frankfurter, of course, had left the bench long before Justice Scalia's entrance
onto the Court.
183. The only laugh that Justice Thomas inspired in the final five years of our study was in
Boyer v. Louisiana. The transcript indicates as follows: "Justice Thomas: Well there -- see, he did
not provide good counsel. [LAUGHTER]." Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Boyer v. Louisiana,
569 U.S. 238 (2013) (No. 11-9953). This comment came in the middle of a discussion about the
competence of a particular lawyer to try a capital case. Id. at 41-42. The joke appears to be that
Justice Thomas was doubting whether being a Yale Law School graduate indicated competence
or incompetence in this regard. We agree with Rory Little's assessment that Justice Thomas
probably did not intend to make an on-the-record comment here. See Rory Little, Argument Re-
cap: Justice Thomas Jokes While Hearing an 'Incredibly... Fact-Bound' Speedy Trial Case,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 15, 2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.scotusblog.comI2013/01/argument-recap-
justice-thomas-jokes-while-hearing-an-incredibly-fact-bound-speedy-trial-case!
[https://perma.cc/FY9L-QEGA].
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sorts of humorous fun at her critics' expense,18 4 and Kate McKinnon
playing her on Saturday Night Live doling out zingers called
"GinsBURNs." 18 5 But it is worth noting that although both she and
Justice O'Connor look like outliers in the modern era, they are not low
on the humor scale overall. Justice Ginsburg appears in the top half of
Figure 2, and Justice O'Connor is very close to the top half. Justice
O'Connor is the lowest ranking Justice on the laughter scale in the
modern era--other than the silent Thomas-and even she raised her
game somewhat in her later years, after 1995.
The rest of the Justices in the modern era are much more
active in inducing laughter, but they are also much more varied in
their behavior. We see that Justice Scalia was indeed number one, but
he showed considerable change over time-he had a clear, consistently
upward trajectory from his arrival on the Court in 1986 when, for the
first five years, he was consistently under 0.5 laughs per argument;
subsequently, he barely ever dropped below 0.5 in any Term after that
(other than after Bush v. Gore,186 which was associated with
significant decreases on a number of dimensions).18 7 He then regularly
clocked in at more than one laugh per argument for each Term of his
later career.
Also, again, we see in Figure 3.B that Justice Breyer was not as
active in his early years on the Court but became increasingly so, with
a strong upward trajectory over time. Chief Justice Roberts is active
but less varied; Justice Souter was perhaps surprisingly active;
Justice Kagan shows an upward trend and is now approaching 0.5
laughs per argument; Justice Alito is lower overall, but also shows a
very constant upward trend; and Justice Stevens went from a typical
traditional pre-2000 Justice to a modern Justice, with an almost dead
worm transforming into an active butterfly around 1990. Chief Justice
Rehnquist followed a similar pattern until he had a sharp drop-off,
possibly associated with his illness prior to death. The high rate of
variation among the modern Justices, and particularly the change
184. Stephanie Francis Ward, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Become an Unlikely Pop
Culture Icon, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
ruth bader-ginsburg-pop-culture icon [https://perma.cc/Z7MP-Z5UR]; see Popular Items for
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/market/ruth-bader-ginsburg (last visited
Sept. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/J8JW-XDPE].
185. See, e.g., Saturday Night Live, Weekend Update: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Brett
Kavanaugh, YoUTUBE (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aY8A2cpK6tg
[https://perma.cc/9CY5-32SC].
186. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
187. This will be the subject of a forthcoming blog post on ScotusOA, following the publica-
tion of this article. SCOTUS OA, http://scotusoa.com.
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to 2017, the same as in Figure 1. We calculated two alternate versions
of this data, one simply by omitting Justice Scalia and the other by
replacing Justice Scalia with a simulated Justice who was the average
of all of the other Justices in a given term. The Court without Justice
Scalia is depicted by the dashed line and the Court with a simulated
average Justice taking the place of Justice Scalia is depicted by the
dotted line.
FIGURE 5: JUSTICE LAUGHTER EPISODES, WITH JUSTICE SCALIA,
WITHOUT JUSTICE SCALIA, AND WITH AN AVERAGE SUBSTITUTE
4-
0
0
-
C,,'
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0-
1955 19'65 19'75 19 85 19'95 20'05 201 5
Term
Justice Laughter (with Scalia)
----------- Justice Laughter (Scalia Stand-in*)
- - - Justice Laughter (Scalia Missing)
Scalia replaced with an average of the other justices
Without doubt, as the figure clearly demonstrates, Justice
Scalia accounted for more laughter than the average Justice during
his tenure on the Court. Nonetheless, his marginal contribution is not
as significant as the dramatic upward shift in judicial laughter during
the 1980s in total. What is more, the general shape of the time trend
with Justice Scalia, without Justice Scalia, and with our simulated
Justice looks the same. This reinforces what we have already seen:
Justice Scalia is influential but by no means dominant.
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III. HUMOR AS AN EQUALIZER VERSUS HUMOR AS A WEAPON
As we saw in Section I.B, jokes at the advocate's expense are so
common that we had to come up with subcategories for them. There
are many more examples we can draw on: for instance, when
Assistant to the Solicitor General Anthony Yang provided an
explanation that Justice Kagan did not like, she got a laugh for
commenting that it was "[n]ot an A-plus explanation." 18 9 In Elgin v.
Department of the Treasury, Justice Breyer even managed to have a
joke at the expense of both sides:
Justice Breyer: [R]eally what the argument boils down to
is ... if we accept your position, there's a
kind of procedural complexity and anomaly.
And your argument is that his position's
worse. And yours is also fairly bad.
[LAUGHTER] .190
In this Part, we move beyond showing that much of the
laughter at the Court comes at the expense of the advocates in general
to showing that it comes at the expense of particular advocates. It is
not random which advocates the Justices target for their barbs;
rather, courtroom humor is part of their advocacy and strategy. As
such, not only is laughter not a beneficent tool of equalization, it is in
fact a weapon of advocacy to be used against the weak.
A. Friend Versus Foe
The distribution of laughter at the Court is not random. In the
same way that the Justices have more to say to the side they
eventually vote against, 191 we find that the Justices direct their jokes
at the expense of the advocates they do not support. To help establish
this "friend versus foe" difference, Figure 6 below illustrates the
difference in Justice laughter depending on whether the Justice
ultimately agrees or disagrees with the advocate. By the terms "agree"
and "disagree," we simply mean that the Justice ultimately votes for
189. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016)
(No. 15-415).
190. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Elgin v. Dep't of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012)
(No. 11-45).
191. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18, at 1227; Jacobi & Sag, supra note 20.
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or against the advocate's side of the argument. Values are depicted for
each Justice and normalized on a per-argument basis.
FIGURE 6: EACH JUSTICE'S TENDENCY TO INSPIRE LAUGHTER,
BY DIFFERENCE IN AGREE/DISAGREE WITH ADVOCATE
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The five Justices at the top of the scale in Figure 6 all lie
slightly to the right of zero, meaning that, to a very small extent, they
each inspire laughter more often during the time allotted for the
advocate they ultimately agree with. The effect for each of these
Justices is very small and cannot be statistically differentiated from
zero, that is, neutrality. Also, they are the exceptions. All of the other
Justices, to varying extents, lie to the left of zero, meaning that they
more frequently cause laughter during the time of the advocate they
ultimately oppose.
For the Justices to the left and right of zero on the top half of
the figure, the numbers are very small-there is no meaningful
difference between those who favor one side versus the other. If the
top half of the table was our only result, we would conclude there was
no bias for friend or foe. However, the bottom half of the table is far
different: approximately half of the Justices use courtroom humor
significantly more often during the time of their foes than during that
of their friends. Strikingly, the five Justices who joke a little more in
the time of their friends are all Justices from the earlier era. In fact,
every single Justice in the top half of the table, where there is little
difference, are all from the earlier era. With once again the sole
exception of Justice Frankfurter, every Justice appearing in the
bottom half of the table, meaning they joke significantly more during
the time of their foes, is from the modern era. This agreement
difference is an almost perfect form of differentiation between the two
eras of the Court.
Note also that even within the modern era, the Justices who
most often inspire laughter-what Wexler would call the "funniest
Justices"-are in fact the most biased in their use of humor. Justices
Breyer, Souter, Scalia, and Kagan were four of the seven "funniest"
Justices in Figure 2 above, and they are the four most biased Justices
in terms of the agreement differential. Not all of the so-called funniest
Justices are at the very top of the bias rankings, but all lie near the
top-for instance, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch are third
and fourth, respectively, in overall laughs and are sixth and ninth,
respectively, in the laughter bias ranking. The only real exception is
Justice Frankfurter, who drops from fifth in overall laughs to twelfth
in bias, but of course he is the only Justice ranking high on the
laughter ratings who is from the previous era, suggesting once again
that things have changed, and that laughter in the courtroom really is
different in the modern era.
Next, Figure 7 explores the agree/disagree differential in
aggregate for the Court over time. We assess this in three different
[Vol. 72:5:14231480
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ways to show how the mode of analysis alters the apparent effect. The
first graph shows the agree/disagree differential in raw numbers-it
essentially aggregates the previous figure for the Court as a whole.
The second graph shows the same results normalized per 250 speech
events, and the third graph shows the results normalized per five
thousand words. Negative numbers, that is, bars below the zero line,
reflect when the Justices tend to use courtroom humor more against
advocates they disagree with. That is, Figure 7 is still not looking at
how the Court rules as a whole-which we do in the next section-but
rather whether the Court as a whole shows the tendency that
individual Justices in the bottom half of the figure above exemplify.
FIGURE 7: JUSTICE LAUGHTER OVER TIME, DIFFERENCE IN
AGREE/DISAGREE WITH ADVOCATES, MEASURED IN THREE WAYS
0I
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
Term
If all else was even, and the two sides of each argument were
treated equally, the bars on each of the three graphs above would be
at the zero line. Instead, what we see is a stark difference in the first
graph: the raw figures show a clear trend in the second half of our
study period in favor of Justices resorting to humor more often during
the time of their foes. But the results are more mixed in the two
proportional measures. These measures normalize laughter by some
measure of how active the Justice was during oral argument, either by
2019] 1481
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speech episodes or by words. What do these different results tell us?
Figure 7 shows that Justices do in fact use laughter overwhelmingly
against their foes as a descriptive matter. But the proportional results
indicate that once other attributes of advocacy have been accounted
for, it is hard to say whether laughter is an independent sign of
judicial advocacy, or simply associated with the disagreement gap in
terms of words spoken or speech events that we have identified
previously. 192 That is, Justices clearly show favoritism in their use of
humor in the modern era, but most of that effect is captured by
looking at how active the Justices are in general.
We also explored the relationship between Justice laughter and
agreement using multivariate logistic regression. Specifically, we
tested the relationship in a series of regressions specifying Justice
laughter as the dependent variable and agreement, number of words
spoken, Term, political salience, and legal salience as the main
independent or causal variables. In the main regression, there is no
statistically significant effect for agreement. The dummy variable for
agreement in our main regression is significant at the 0.10 level, well
outside the conventional threshold for statistical significance in a
study like this. 193 Repeating the same analysis, but limited to the post-
1995 era, we find that agreement is significant at the 0.05 level and
makes Justice laughter less likely (that is, the odds ratio is less than
one). However, the explanatory power of this model is very weak to
the point that it is unconvincing. 194
The regression analysis and the graphical analysis are
consistent. Both suggest that when the Justices engage in courtroom
humor, they do so out of disagreement with the advocate who is
speaking. However, the predictive value of laughter is only as an
alternative to words spoken or speech events: laughter gives us no
significant additional information in terms of agreement. This is
entirely consistent with our hypothesis of courtroom humor as an act
of dominance or a signal of opposition, but it leaves room for the
alternative theory that the Justices make more jests at advocates they
disagree with, but only because they spend more time speaking to
them in the first place. Put another way, while we can predict who a
given Justice would favor based on who is the butt of his or her jokes,
192. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 18; Jacobi & Sag, supra note 20.
193. See infra Statistical Appendix, Model 1.
194. See infra Statistical Appendix, Model 2. The explanatory power of a model is estimated
by the Pseudo R-squared value, which ranges from zero to one. We always expected the explana-
tory power of a regression model investigating a rare event such as laughter to be low, but the
Pseudo R-squared value for Model 2 is actually zero.
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we could have ascertained that same information from examining who
the Justice spoke more to, and laughter tells us little new in addition
to that.
In sum, the data is consistent with the view that courtroom
humor is itself a form of judicial advocacy, or is at least a byproduct of
that advocacy; it is entirely inconsistent with the equalization thesis.
In terms of when laughter became a form of advocacy used mostly
against one's foes, we can see from the same Figure that in raw
numbers, there was no meaningful difference prior to around 1980.
From 1955 to 1985, there is a disagreement gap in laughter in
absolute terms, but the number is vanishingly small at an average of -
2.8 episodes of laughter per Term. In the period between 1986 and
1995, the disagreement gap increases to an average of -18.1 episodes
per Term. And from 1996 to 2017, it increases again to an average of -
28.1 episodes per Term. Once again, this is consistent with our
previous findings on judicial advocacy and oral argument: that the
increase has been quite marked since 1995. The fact that the
disagreement gap increased significantly in the mid-1980s, and then
again in the mid-1990s, strongly suggests that the use of courtroom
humor by the Justices is part and parcel of judicial advocacy and not
an idiosyncratic phenomenon linked to the personality of a particular
Justice.
B. Laughter as a Sign of Advocate Weakness
Here we conduct similar analysis directed at the associated
question of the relationship between the use of courtroom humor by
the Justices and whether an advocate is winning or losing the
argument. Put another way, is the advocate subject to the Justices'
jokes more likely to be one who the Court as a whole disfavors in the
ultimate decision? Investigating this question gives us case-specific
insight into judicial laughter as a signal of the advocate's weakness.
As we saw in Section I.B, the fact that the advocate's argument is not
going so well is the punchline of many of the Justices' jokes. This can
be as explicit as the many versions of "how would you like to lose?"
195
At other times, the laugh comes from the Justice pointing out the
weakness of the argument, with the implication being a likely loss.
One such example is Justice Kennedy saying to an advocate, 'Your --
your whole argument gives me intellectual
195. See sources cited supra note 98 and accompanying text.
14832019]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
whiplash... [LAUGHTER],"' 196 or when the state was attempting to
defend denial of same-sex marriage rights and Justice Ginsburg said
that they were advocating "two kinds of marriage, the full marriage,
and then this sort of skim milk marriage. [LAUGHTER]." 197 Figure 8
confirms our hypothesis that these examples are representative-that
laughter often comes at the expense of a losing advocate. Like Figure 7
above, it illustrates the difference in Justice laughter depending on an
attribute of the advocate, but in this case, the attribute we focus on is
whether the advocate ultimately wins or loses. Like Figure 7 above,
these values are normalized on a per argument basis.
We see a similar pattern to the agree/disagree difference in
that there is an overwhelmingly large effect of Justices making jokes
during the time of losing advocates. Furthermore, the win/lose
differential follows a similar pattern to agree/disagree, in that there
are a small handful of Justices who lie on the positive side of zero,
indicating that they use courtroom humor more during the time of
winning advocates, but with the exception of Justice Stevens, these
effects are very small; they are dwarfed in comparison to the quite
large effects shown by the Justices in the bottom half of the scale, who
significantly favor making jokes during the time of losing advocates.
This obvious difference between Justice Stevens and the rest of the
modern Court fits with his reputation for politeness: as we have
shown elsewhere, Justice Stevens was exceptionally polite for a
Justice on the modern Court, the Justice most often to use
traditionally polite language, such as "May I ask?" or "Can I ask?"198
This may be idiosyncratic or may represent a distinct Midwestern
style.199 In addition to the unusual Justice Stevens, there are three
Justices for whom the win/lose difference sums to exactly zero: Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Clark, and Justice Harlan were precisely
evenhanded in this sense.
196. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, BG Group PLC v. Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 (2013)
(No. 12-138).
197. Transcript of Oral Argument at 71, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No.
12-307).
198. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Politeness and Formality in Supreme Court Oral Argu-
ments, SCOTUS OA (Aug. 27, 2018), https://scotusoa.com/category/politeness/ [https://perma.cc/
7R4D-2JHN] (showing "Justice Stevens has the highest level [since 1955] of using traditionally
polite language, primarily by utilizing the polite preliminary phrases 'May I ask?' or 'Can I
ask?' "). Justice Kagan is the Justice most likely to use less traditional forms of politeness, par-
ticularly the formalism of naming the advocate before asking a question. Id.
199. Matt Sundquist, Justice John Paul Stevens From the Bench: Arguments, Questions, and
Dissents, SCOTUSBLOG (May 4, 2010, 6:00 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2010/05/ustice-
john-paul-stevens-from-the-bench-arguments-questions -and-dissents/ [https://perma.cc/99WK-
A8R8] (noting that Justice Stevens is "polite, thoughtful, and humorous" during oral argument).
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FIGURE 8: EACH JUSTICE'S TENDENCY TO INSPIRE LAUGHTER,
BY DIFFERENCE IN ADVOCATE WIN/LOSE
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Once again, the Justices lying in the top half of the scale,
showing the small effect of joking more during winning advocates, are
again overwhelmingly from the early Court era, with two exceptions.
The first is that Justice Thomas measures almost imperceptibly on
that side of the ledger, but as mentioned, his laughs are even rarer
than his speech episodes, which are so few as to make his silence
legendary,200 and so this effect is insignificant. But of more
significance, Chief Justice Roberts also appears in the top third of the
scale. The size of his positive effect is very small, making him
essentially neutral rather than biased against losing advocates. But
neutrality makes Chief Justice Roberts remarkable: all of the other
Justices of the modern era appear down the bottom of the scale,
significantly favoring the use of jokes during the time of losing
advocates. This may be because a large percentage of the Chiefs jokes
are about procedure and timekeeping due to his unique role as Chief
Justice, so his seemingly unusual lack of bias in the modern era may
be a result of his institutional role. All other Justices of the Roberts
Court and later Rehnquist Court appear down the bottom half of the
scale, showing bias against losing advocates. And again, the Justices
with the biggest number of laughs are also those who are most biased
against losing advocates: the top five are Justices Breyer, Scalia,
Gorsuch, Kagan, and Souter, who all appear in the top seven in
overall laughter.
Once again, then, this runs contrary to the equalization
thesis-Justices overwhelmingly direct humor at advocates who are
losing. Figure 9 shows that not only are "losers" more often the butt of
Justices' jokes, but the effect has strong predictive power, even
controlling for other aspects of advocacy.
200. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Supreme Court Justices Are Speaking up More Because
They're Not Afraid to Be Partisan, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://wapo.st/2GDoX2v
[https://perma.cc/2NU9-5VLB] ('Thomas went 682 cases without uttering a single word between
2006 and 2016. When he eventually broke that silence, it made national news.").
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FIGURE 9: JUSTICE LAUGHTER OVER TIME,
DIFFERENCE IN ADVOCATE WIN/LOSE, MEASURED IN THREE
WAYS
N
T
0]
1u 1965 , 7 1 .mE 520521
Figure 9 above takes the same approach as Figure 7 above,
showing the win/lose differential using raw laughs, laughs normalized
by 250 speech events, and laughs normalized per five thousand words.
Using courtroom humor more during the time of the losing advocate is
presented as negative, below the zero line. Once again, if the Justices'
behavior was neutral, the win/loss ratio should be close to zero. If the
behavior was random, it should add up to close to zero in spite of
Term-to-Term. fluctuation. Note that advocates here include the
solicitor general and amici if their argument supporting one side is
clear.
All three figures show a strong effect in favor of resorting to
courtroom humor during the time of the losing advocate. The effect is
particularly strong after 1995. We tested this relationship more
formally in regression analysis specifying Justice laughter as the
dependent variable and winner, number of words spoken, Term,
political salience, and legal salience as the main dependent or causal
variables. In this regression, the dummy variable indicating whether
the advocate ultimately won the case, Winner, was significant at the
14872019]
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0.00 level with an odds ratio of 0.88. An odds ratio of less than one
means that the event is less likely.20 1 This analysis confirms the clear
impression from Figure 9 that there is a meaningful bias in the
direction of courtroom laughter against the losing advocate. The same
regression also shows that there is a statistically significant effect for
post-1985 and post-1995 incidences.
Since 1995, it has been very rare for the difference to be above
zero-there were only three or four (depending on the measure) Terms
during the Roberts Court in which there was not a tendency for the
overall Court to make more jokes during the time of losing advocates.
In contrast, the effect between 1985 and 1995 is much less clear.
Overall, the fact that the Justices direct their courtroom humor much
more towards advocates who are losing directly rebuts the
equalization thesis. Moreover, the fact that this win/lose differential
increased significantly in the post-1995 era is consistent with our
earlier research linking increased judicial advocacy to political
polarization, and this in turn reinforces our view that the Justices use
courtroom humor deliberately as a tool of advocacy.
The data also shows there is new information to be gained from
looking at the direction of laughter episodes. In contrast to the
agree/disagree differential, which showed evidence that laughter is a
tool of advocacy but provided no new information on top of that
gleaned from other tools of advocacy, here we have significant
additional predictive power from laughter. In terms of the win/lose
differential, there is new information to be gained on who is likely to
win or lose a case even when we have controlled for the number of
words spoken or the speech episodes. Table 2 illustrates the effect,
dividing the data into four eras that track the four stages of the
Court's development. 20 2 Negative numbers are bolded for ease of
reference.
201. See infra Statistical Appendix, Model 1.
202. In some cases, we were unable to match the speech event to the ultimate winner or loser
of the case. This explains why the numbers in the Winning and Losing columns do not precisely
match the Total column.
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TABLE 2: JUSTICE LAUGHTER,
DIFFERENCE IN IF ADVOCATE WINS/LOSES, BY ERA
Justice Laughter Win/Lose Difference
Per 250 Per
Speech 5,000
Era Total Winning Losing Actual Events Words
1955-1969 26.60 12.27 11.27 1.00 0.01 0.01
1970-1985 49.75 22.25 25.81 -3.56 -0.05 -0.03
1986-1995 130.00 61.80 67.00 -5.20 0.05 0.15
1996-1917 159.59 69.68 88.09 -18.41 -0.87 -0.42
From 1970 to 1985, the results on all three measures are
bolded to indicate they are negative-that is, they show the predictive
bias-but the effect is very small. From 1985 to 1995, the effect is once
again a small negative number in actual terms and is positive if we
use the relative measures. But after 1995, the effects on all three
measures are in the direction predicted, showing bias against losing
advocates, and are substantially and statistically significant. 20 3 That
means that in the era of political polarization, when the Justices are
behaving more like advocates across various measures-from talking,
to interrupting, to making comments rather than asking questions-
the Justices are also using laughter against both advocates they
personally disagree with and advocates who are losing the Court as a
whole. In addition, in the latter aspect, laughter is not only a weapon
of advocacy-it is a refined enough weapon that it can be used as a
predictive tool, even controlling for other forms of advocacy, such as
talking more often and at greater length.
This puts another nail in the coffin of the assertion that
laughter is used as an equalizing tool at oral argument. The Justices
are making fun of losing advocates, using their own weakness against
them. If equalization means anything, it means the opposite of that. It
is also interesting to think about the cause and effect here: the
Justices are either making fun of the advocates' weakness or may
actually be contributing to that weakness-that is, the use of
203. See infra Statistical Appendix, Models 1, 3, 4, and 5.
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courtroom humor itself may highlight their weakness and make other
Justices more likely to rule against them. It seems poetic that loss and
laughter are forever entwined.
C. Advocate Experience and Inexperience
Now we turn to a different measure of weakness: advocate
inexperience. Of course, an inexperienced advocate may not be weak
in terms of quality, but their inexperience may at least contribute to
the perception of weakness. We are interested here in whether
advocates are treated differently when they are more or less
experienced. First, we want to know whether the Justices use
courtroom humor more during the time allotted for more
inexperienced advocates. For this purpose and for the analysis that
follows, we classify the advocates into four levels of experience:
"novices," those arguing their first case before the Court, who make up
the majority of advocates; "adepts," those repeat players who are by no
means highly experienced but have argued between two and four
cases, including the case at hand; "champions," whose experience
ranges from five to ten cases; and "heroes," who have appeared at
least eleven times.20 4 These categories are not evenly distributed;
there were 5,458 appearances by Novices in our data, 2,695 by Adepts,
only 1,414 by Champions, and 6,626 by Heroes.
The results are clear. The Justices are significantly more likely
to make the kind of comments that provoke the courtroom gallery into
laughter while a Novice is speaking, and are significantly less likely to
do so during the time of the advocates we classify as Heroes. Novice
advocates experience judicial laughter at a rate of 0.55 episodes per
appearance; that number drops to 0.41 and 0.45 for Adepts and
Champions, respectively; and it drops precipitously to 0.19 for
Heroes. 20 5 Regression analysis confirms the significance of the Novice
category as a predictor of the use of courtroom humor by the
Justices. 206
204. The average for this group was just over 33. The most experienced advocate in this co-
hort was Lawrence G. Wallace, who made his 138th appearance in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), argued, Nov. 12, 2002.
205. The differences between each category and the remaining categories are significant at
the 0.01 level using a conventional t-test. The difference between the means for Adept and
Champion is not statistically significant.
206. Unreported regressions confirm that experience group is highly statistically significant.
In our main regression, reported at Model 1 in the Statistical Appendix, we include both Novice
and Hero as explanatory variables for Justice laughter along with other explanatory variables
already discussed. See infra Statistical Appendix, Model 1. In this estimation, Novice makes Jus-
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These differences are just the tip of the iceberg. Further
examination suggests that there is a significant interaction between
experience level and the agree/disagree and win/lose differentials.
Figure 10 shows the results in graphical form.
FIGURE 10: JUSTICE LAUGHTER, DIFFERENCE IN AGREE/DISAGREE AND
WIN/LOSE, BY ADVOCATE EXPERIENCE
Justice Laughter Agree/Disagree Difference
Novice (1) Adept (2-4) Champion (5-10) Hero '(11+)
Justice Laughter Win/Lose Difference
c J
2,-
Novice (1) Adept (2-4) Champion (5-10) Hero (11 +)
Normalized by number of appearances
The top graph in Figure 10 shows the relationship between
laughter caused by the Justices during an oral argument appearance
and our agree/disagree differential, by our four categories of advocate
experience. The lower graph shows the same, but looking at the
winflose differential. The numbers reflected in the figure are means of
the Term averages of the relevant differentials. A cursory examination
of Figure 10 suggests that it is Novice advocates who experience the
biggest difference in terms of both the win/lose and the agree/disagree
differentials. Graphically, the effect is almost perfectly as we
hypothesized: the biggest difference in terms of both win/lose and
tice laughter more likely (i.e., the odds ratio is more than 1) and is significant at the 0.01 level,
whereas there is no statistically significant effect for Hero.
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agree/disagree is for Novice advocates. As noted above, advocates who
have never argued a case before are the most likely to find the
Justices making jokes at their expense, but more than that, those
same advocates also see much higher associations between that
laughter and their win/lose and agree/disagree differentials. The next
largest effect is for Adepts; Champions are treated much like Adepts
in terms of agree/disagree but face less bias in terms of win/lose, as
expected; and Heroes not only face the smallest amount of bias on
both measures, but for win/lose they actually rise above the zero line,
meaning there is actually slightly more laughter when they are
winning, though still less laughter when a Justice agrees with the
advocate.
Interestingly, the clear picture on the graphs becomes a little
muddy in regression analysis. When we added interaction terms to our
main regression examining the potential causes of Justice laughter,
we saw a significant result for the interaction between Novice and
Winner, but not for Novice and Agreement. The odds ratio for the
Novice*Winner interaction term is less than one, which implies that
although being a Novice advocate makes Justice laughter more likely,
being a winning Novice counteracts that effect. 20 7 Thus, although the
graph suggests that Novices experience uneven treatment in terms of
both the agree/disagree and win/lose differentials, the win/lose
differential appears to be doing most of the work. None of this
diminishes the more general finding that the burden of Justice
laughter falls disproportionately upon the Novice advocates. The fact
that this effect is compounded when those Novices are losing implies
that laughter at the Court has a mean-spirited edge.
D. Assessing the "Funniest Justices" in Light of These Results
In this Part, we have shown that Justices are most likely to
inspire laughter during the time allotted for advocates with whom
they will ultimately disagree in the case at hand and when the
advocate is losing. Both of these effects show that the Justices use
courtroom humor as a weapon of advocacy. We have also shown that
those effects are particularly stark for inexperienced advocates. We
conclude that judicial laughter is certainly not a sign of an empathetic
attempt to equalize a hierarchical system; rather, laughter is a blood
sport at the Court.
207. See infra Statistical Appendix, Model 3.
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In the previous Part, we showed that laughter attributable to
the Justices became much more common in Supreme Court oral
arguments in the late 1980s. We confirmed that indeed, of all the
Justices, Justice Scalia used courtroom humor the most, followed by
Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Gorsuch. But we
also noted that it is the Justices who get the most laughs who tend to
show the greatest bias in how their jokes are targeted. Taken
together, then, what does it mean to win the title of the "funniest
Justice"? In general, it means that these Justices are the most pointed
advocates. As we discussed in Section I.B, Justice Breyer, and to a
lesser extent Justice Kagan, are exceptional in being self-deprecating,
but we have shown that the overall humor of the Court is pretty mean.
Justice Scalia is often lauded for being so funny, but if laughter
is a weapon, that means that Justice Scalia is simply the most acerbic,
and the most strategic at this particular type of advocacy. One
response to this might be that perhaps Justice Scalia is just naturally
funny, but testimony from his clerks belies this claim. A former
Blackmun clerk attests that Justice Scalia tried hard to get laughs,
describing him as "play[ing] to the crowd. ' 208 Another seemingly
disagreed, saying "that is who he is" but then in the same interview
acknowledged that Justice Scalia "understood sometimes humor
makes the point clearly" and sought to use it in this way. 20 9 A number
of others have acknowledged that Justice Scalia used humor out of
anger,210 and commentators have noted that most of his humor was
sarcastic, 211 and was frequently bullying.212 Justice Scalia, we argue,
put the punch in punchline.
208. See Liptak, supra note 29 (quoting Pamela S. Karlan).
209. Ross, supra note 30 (quoting John Duffy).
210. Id. (suggesting that while some of his humor was hard to predict, "there [were] certain
issues sure to draw his ire").
211. Malphurs, supra note 58, at 2 (noting that in the 2015 Term, "Justice Scalia more often
adopted a sarcastic approach, probably not a surprise to anyone").
212. Obviously this is a subjective view, but it is one that is widely held. See, e.g., RICHARD L.
HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION 66
(2018) (reporting the view of certain liberal Justices that "Scalia was a polarizing figure who
used humor in a demeaning and condescending way, sometimes to punch down at lawyers at oral
argument"); see also BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 433 (2014) (quoting veter-
an Court reporter Linda Greenhouse querying, "[W]hat does this smart, rhetorically gifted man
think his bullying accomplishes?"); J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful Dissent: Justice Scalia's Regret-
table Legacy of Incivility, 18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201, 292 (2017) (describing Justice Scalia's
approach as "bullying and bombast, invective and attack"). But see Steven G. Calabresi, Fore-
word: In Memory of Justice Antonin Scalia, 50 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 165, 165, 168 (2017) (describing
Justice Scalia as "a Platonic leader who was both a man of ideas and a man of action" and "what
the ancient Greeks might have called a philosopher king" who displayed all the virtues of "Wis-
dom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice, as well as... Faith, Hope, and Love").
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The point is not simply that Justice Scalia's humor was
sometimes mean, but rather that this meanness is an essential part of
his legacy. Justice Scalia was an important champion of the
jurisprudential theories of textualism and originalism.213 For him,
these supposedly neutral and objective tools of legal analysis
separated legal decisionmaking from the personality or political
preferences of individual Justices. Yet Justice Scalia's behavior at oral
argument was far from neutral, objective, or impersonal. As Richard
Hasen reports in a recent study of Justice Scalia's legacy, The Justice
of Contradictions, Justice Scalia's "demeaning and condescending" use
of humor and his tendency to "punch down" from the Bench is part of
what made Justice Scalia such a polarizing figure. 214 At oral
argument, he constantly sought to inject his personality into the
discussion, quite often in the form of sarcastic and snarky
comments. 215 There is ample support for the view that Justice Scalia
used humor as a deliberate strategy to dominate and disrupt
advocates and his fellow Justices. 216  This assessment sits
incongruously with Justice Scalia's claims of judicial neutrality. As
Richard Hasen astutely observes, one of the great ironies of Justice
Scalia's legacy is that he used his claim to impersonal objective
legitimacy in highly personalized attacks on the legitimacy of his
fellow Justices when they disagreed with him. 217
The contrast between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer is
illuminating. Justices Scalia and Breyer were two of the most active
Justices in oral argument during the time period of our study. Up
until Justice Scalia's death, they were also the two Justices who made
the greatest use of courtroom humor, and both were far more likely to
213. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862
(1989) (describing the pros and cons of both originalism and nonoriginalism, and concluding that
originalism is his preferred approach).
214. HASEN, supra note 212, at 66.
215. For example 'Wow. Wow, that's -- I mean, that's my comment. [LAUGHTER]," Tran-
script of Oral Argument, Shapiro, supra note 86, at 37; "Gee, we ponder all the time, and we
think we're being diligent. [LAUGHTER]," Transcript of Oral Argument, Rodriguez, supra note
93, at 16; "Oh, yeah, I'm sure that's what they all had in mind. I have no doubt of that.
[LAUGHTER]," Transcript of Oral Argument, MacLean, supra note 87, at 48; 'You're supposed
to say 'yes, sir, good.' [LAUGHTER]," Transcript of Oral Argument, Patchak, supra note 102, at
36; and "It's the 'go away' principle of our jurisprudence, right? [LAUGHTER]," Transcript of
Oral Argument, Gen. Dynamics Corp., supra note 88, at 60.
216. See DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH 43 (2018) (observing that Scalia
"often hogged" oral argument at the Supreme Court).
217. HASEN, supra note 212, at 174-75 ('The raison d'etre for his language-based tools of in-
terpretation was to legitimize the Supreme Court's decisionmaking process. He saw himself re-
making legal analysis to serve the greater good. But his attacks on fellow [J]ustices for not using
his methodology served to delegitimize their decisions, and the Court's by extension.").
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use that humor against advocates with whom they disagreed, and
against advocates who were losing the argument. For all that, there
are also significant differences between them. First, as discussed in
Section I.B, Justice Breyer's humor is largely genial and self-
deprecating, in contrast to Justice Scalia's sarcastic and biting
approach. Second, and more importantly, Justice Breyer does not
claim a judicial philosophy of impersonal objectivity. If Justice Breyer
inserts himself into oral argument through humor, he is not being a
hypocrite when he does so.
CONCLUSION
Laughter at Supreme Court oral arguments has been mostly
misunderstood. Treating laughter in the courtroom as a lighthearted
distraction that is random and meaningless fails to recognize that
patterns can be identified, beyond who is "the funniest." Use of
laughter is another form of strategic behavior by the Justices, like
favoring comments over questions and interrupting. Courtroom humor
is a form of advocacy, a mechanism by which one party can be
preferred over another during an important part of the
decisionmaking process of the Court. Likewise, claiming that laughter
is an equalizing force at the Court is facially absurd-even reading or
listening to one Term of arguments should make it clear that most
jokes are at the expense of advocates, not an aid to them, and often
take the form of "I am the judge, stay in your place." An imbalance of
power between the Justices and the advocates may seem inevitable,
but it is not inconsequential. 218 And when examined over decades at
the Court, it becomes clear that this tendency is not simply a matter of
tone: laughter is used strategically by the Justices to shape the
process and, potentially, the outcome. Laughter incidents are exercises
of control by Justices over their subordinates that are used
strategically to favor preferred positions.
This helps us better understand another aspect of individual
judicial behavior: the Justices use humor as a tool of rhetoric and
advocacy and as an expression of power and dominance. Additionally,
we can also observe the way the Court as a whole has changed over
time. Episodes of laughter have increased over time, even accounting
for the massive rise in Justices' dominance of argument time. Oral
arguments have become more performative, and this change is
218. Barry Sullivan, Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle and the Moral Life of
Judges, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 357 (2016).
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seemingly not driven by the selection process alone, since we observe
changes in Justices' behavior after decades on the Court.
Furthermore, laughter provides information to Court observers,
making outcomes more predictable. Justices make jokes more during
the time of the advocate they will individually rule against and
against advocates whom they perceive (mostly correctly) are losing
arguments. Consequently, considering the patterns that we have
identified helps predict case outcomes before Justices have even voted.
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Dependent
Variable
Agreement
Winner
Novice
Hero
Novice*Agreement
Novice*Winner
Term
Words
Salience (NYT)
Salience (CQ)
Post 1985
Post 1995
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Justice
Justice Justice Justice Laughter per
Laughter Laughter Laughter 5000 words
4 .~
1.06*
0.87***
1.09***
0.99
0.93**
1.02*** 1.00
1.06*
0.87***
1.14*** 1.09***
0.98 0.99
1.02
0.91**
1.03*** 1.02***
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.37*** 1.21*** 1.37*** 1.37***
1.13**
2.84***
1.11**
1.05 1.13** 1.13**
2.83*** 2.84***
1.10** 1.11**
Model 5
Advocate
Laughter
1.04
1.00
0.94
1.18***
1.02***
1.00***
1.45***
1.23***
1.49***
0.85**
Constant 0.00*** 0.22 0.00*** 0.0O*** 0".O**
Observations 729,973 190,529 729,973 729,973 709,486
R-Squared 1 0.065 0.000 0.065 0.065 0.016
Logistic regression using robust standard errors reporting odds ratios. Odds ratios
of more (less) than one indicate that the dependent variable is (more) less likely.
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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